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ABSTRACT

The Copyright Act gives a copyright owner the exclusive right
"to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work." Does
the Copyright Act require that a derivative work be "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression" in order to be infringing? Existing
case law is contradictory, stating both that a derivative work does not
need to be "fixed" but that it does need to be embodied in some
"concrete or permanent form." This contradiction stems from the fact
that although the statutory language does not appear to require
fixation, reading the statutory language literally would render illegal
merely imagining a modified version of a copyrighted work. This
contradiction can be eliminated by recognizing that what Congress
intended was to prohibit the public performance of an unfixed
derivative work, as well as the reproduction, public distribution,
public performance or public display of a fixed derivative work.
Congress' intent can be fully implemented by holding that the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works is dependent upon, rather
than independent of, the other four exclusive rights. The advantage of
this interpretation is that it leaves all private performances of a
derivative work, whether fixed or unfixed, outside the realm of
copyright infringement.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose a person sits down at a piano and creates a new
arrangement of a popular song. Later, he performs the new
arrangement for some friends in the privacy of his home. Has he
infringed the copyright in the musical work? Does it matter if he
writes the arrangement down instead of memorizing it?'
Suppose another person cuts a photograph out of a book, mounts
it upon a ceramic tile, and displays the mounted photo in her home.
Has she infringed the copyright in the photograph? 2 Does it make a
difference if she places a transparent piece of pink plastic over the
photograph before displaying it? 3 What if she paints the photo with
pink watercolor instead of framing it with pink plastic? 4 What if she
offers the5 pink-framed photo for sale at her local swap meet, or on the
Internet?
Suppose a company creates an electronic device that alters the
display of a popular video game. A teenager plays the video game in
his home while using the device. Has he infringed the copyright in

1. This hypothetical assumes that the musical arrangement is sufficiently original to
constitute a derivative work. Compare Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 989-93 (2d Cir.
1995) (affirming district court's finding that piano-vocal arrangement and other printed and
performed arrangements, with one exception, were not sufficiently original to qualify as

derivative works) with Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 167-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that creating harmony for an existing melody may, in some instances,
be sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection). The question posed is whether
infringement depends upon the fixation of the derivative work, or upon the fact that it was only
performed in private.
2.
Compare Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343-44
(9th Cir. 1988) (yes) with Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997) (no).
3. This variation is based upon a hypothetical posed by Judge Kozinski in Micro Star v.
FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (the "Pink Screener").
4. See Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F. Supp. 2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (application of
paint to mounted poster was an infringing reproduction, but was not sufficiently original to
constitute a derivative work), aff'd in relevant part, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 47
Fed. Appx. 597 (2d Cir. 2002).
5.
This variation raises the issue of public distribution and display of the alleged
derivative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5) (2000). But see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (c) (first-sale
doctrine). It also raises the further issue, which will not be discussed in detail here, of thirdparty liability for the owner of the swap meet or the internet service provider. Compare
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (swap meet owner may be
contributorily and vicariously liable for sale of infringing items) with Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Canus
Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding genuine issues of material fact as to
whether operator of trade show was contributorily or vicariously liable for sale of infringing
items) and 17 U.S.C. § 512 (limitation of liability for Internet service providers).
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the video game?
If so,6 is the device manufacturer liable for
contributory infringement?
Finally, suppose that a person watching a videotape or DVD at
home fast-forwards through certain parts of a movie, or presses the
mute button during playback. Has she infringed the copyright in the
movie?
Suppose instead that a company sells software that
automatically instructs the VCR or DVD player to skip over certain
portions of the movie or to mute certain words. If the same person
If so,
uses the software while watching the movie, has she infringed?
7
is the company liable for direct or contributory infringement?
What these four situations have in common is that each involves
the alleged preparation of a derivative work in the privacy of one's
home, and each involves a potential question of whether the alleged
derivative work is "fixed" in a tangible medium, and therefore
"reproduced," within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 8 Thus, in
each case the same legal question is presented: is the private
preparation of a derivative work, in the absence of any fixation of that
derivative work, a copyright infringement?
In this article, I contend that the proper answer in each of the
four basic situations outlined above is that the person has not
infringed the copyright in the underlying work. Part II of this article
examines the role of fixation in copyright law generally. Part III
analyzes the exclusive right to prepare derivative works and the case
law interpreting that right.
Part IV suggests an alternative
interpretation of the Copyright Act that would achieve more
consistent results in cases of this type; and Part V applies this new
interpretation to each of the four situations outlined above.

II. THE ROLE OF FIXATION IN COPYRIGHT LAW
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "to Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by granting to Authors and
Inventors for limited Times the exclusive right to their respective

6.
See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967-69 (9th
Cir. 1992) (no). But see Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110-12 (distinguishing Galoob where
instructions for altering the display were fixed in software instead of enabled by an electronic
device).
7.
This hypothetical describes the operation of software currently offered for sale by
Clear Play, the legality of which has been challenged in a pending action. See infra notes 224251 and accompanying text.
8.

For definitions of these terms, see supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
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Writings and Discoveries." 9 The term "Writings" has been construed
broadly to mean "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor." 10 In the 1976 Copyright Act, the
Constitutional requirement of a physical rendering is found in the
statutory requirement of fixation in a tangible medium. 1
Section 102 of the Copyright Act grants copyright protection to
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 12 Under section 101, "[a] work
is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in
a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than
' 3
duration."'
transitory
Copyright law draws a distinction between the work (an
intangible intellectual creation in which copyright subsists) and the
tangible object in which the work is fixed. 14 "Copies" are defined as
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed,' 5
and "phonorecords" are defined as material objects in which sounds
are fixed. 16 Thus, for example, a "literary work" is an intangible
sequence of words or symbols, which may be fixed in one or more
"copies" (such as a manuscript, a book, a reel of microfilm, or a
computer disk) and/or in one or more "phonorecords" (such as a

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. For the historical background of the Clause, see Tyler
T. Ochoa and Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'y U.S. 675 (2002).

10. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (emphasis added).
11.
Cf United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (referring to
"the fixation requirement inherent in the term 'Writings' and "the fixation requirement of the
Copyright Clause"); id. at 1281-82 (referring twice to "the fixation requirement of the
Copyright Clause").
12.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
13.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

14. Id § 202 ("Ownership of a copyright.., is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied."). The statute appears to use the word "embodied" as a
synonym for the word "fixed."
15.
Id.§ 101.
16. Id. The definition of "phonorecords" excludes sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, id, so material objects in which both sounds and images are
fixed are classified as "copies" rather than "phonorecords."
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cassette tape or a CD). 17 "A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a
copy or phonorecord for the first time,"' 8 and copyright attaches at the
moment of creation.' 9 Thus, federal copyright law does not protect
works that exist only in an author's mind, and which have not yet
been committed to paper, to film, to disk, or to some other tangible
medium. 20
Copyright protection consists of five exclusive rights set forth in
section 106, which are subject to various limitations and exclusions in
sections 107 through 122.21 Fixation plays an important role in
defining the first, third and fifth of these exclusive rights. The first
exclusive right, for example, is the right "to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords. '22 As seen above, the
terms "copies" and "phonorecords" are both defined as material
objects in which the work is fixed.23 Thus, the right of reproduction is
really the right to produce new fixations of the copyrighted work, i.e.,
the right to fix the work in any material object.24

Copyright

infringement is defined as the unauthorized exercise of any of the

17. Id. ("'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects.., in which they are embodied.").
18. Id.
19.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (duration for works created on or after Jan. 1, 1978); Works
created before 1978 are governed by the 1909 Act, which required either publication with notice
or registration for federal copyright protection to attach, see Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35
Stat. 1075, 1077-78 (1909).
20. It is clear, however, that state law may protect works of authorship that are not yet
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(l); H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 131,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747. Ironically, by defining "creation" in terms of
"fixation," the Copyright Act gives rise to a semantic paradox in which state law can protect a
work of authorship before it is "created"!
21.
17 U.S.C. § 106. There are actually six subsections, the sixth ("in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of digital audio transmission")
having been added in 1995. Logically, however, the sixth subsection should have been
implemented by adding "sound recordings" to the fourth subsection (the exclusive right "to
perform the copyrighted work publicly"), and placing the limitation ("by means of digital audio
transmission" only) in Section 114. This author, therefore, will continue to refer to the six
subsections of section 106 as providing five exclusive rights.
22.
17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
23. Id. § 101; see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
24. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61, reprinted in 1976 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5675 ( "Read
together with the relevant definitions in section 101, the right 'to reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material object in which the work
is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in fixed form").
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exclusive rights.25 Thus, any unauthorized fixation of the work is an
infringement of the exclusive right of reproduction.2 6
The third exclusive right is the right "to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending. 27 Again, the
terms "copies" and "phonorecords" are defined as material objects in
which the work is fixed;28 thus, the public distribution right envisions
that material objects containing the work will be distributed to the
public. 29 Under the first-sale doctrine, once copies or phonorecords
have been distributed by sale or other transfer of ownership, the
copyright owner's exclusive right ceases with respect to those copies
or phonorecords: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3),
the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title ...is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord. '3 °
"Distribution" is synonymous with "publication," which is
defined as "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending." 31 The Act contemplates that works will be "published" in
the manner that books are traditionally published: copies (or
phonorecords) will first be fixed, and then the fixed copies (or
phonorecords) will be distributed to the public. In an electronic
world, of course, distribution occurs in the reverse order: bits of
digital information are transmitted from one location to another and

25.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided in sections 106 through 122 ... is an infringer of the
copyright ....).
26.
Although the definition of "fixed" includes the phrase "by or under the authority of
the author," 17 U.S.C. § 101, this clause is nonsensical in the context of infringement, which by
definition is an unauthorizedexercise of any of the exclusive rights. Thus, the limitation "by or
under the authority of the author" is properly read as applying only to the initial fixation of the
work for purposes of copyright protection; and not to any fixations which are alleged to

constitute
27.
28.
29.

an infringement.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
See supranotes 14-17 and accompanying text.
See R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected

Solution to the Controversy Over "RAM Copies," 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 126-27.

30. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). There are two exceptions: the owner of a copy of a computer
program or of a phonorecord may not rent, lease or lend that copy or phonorecord "for the
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage" without the authorization of the copyright
owner, except in limited circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b).
31.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "publication").
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are fixed at the receiving end.32 The end result is that copies of the
work wind up in the hands of the public, even though no material

objects have ever changed hands, as the language of the Act seems to
require.33 Despite this theoretical difficulty, courts have not been
troubled in concluding that digital transmission is a distribution, and
therefore a "publication," within the meaning of the Act.34
The fifth exclusive right is the right "to display the copyrighted
work publicly." 35 This right does not seem on its face to be limited to
fixed copies. However, the term "display" is defined in section 101
as follows: "[t]o 'display' a work means to show a copy of it, either
directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other
device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
36
audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially."
Thus, the act of display necessarily involves at least one fixed "copy"
of the work which is being displayed.37 The actual viewing of the
display, however, can occur indirectly though means that do not

32. This manner of distribution necessarily results in a reproduction, as there is a new
fixation of the copyrighted work on the receiving end. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 547, 556-57 (1997). In
addition, as the transmission occurs by copying the data from computer to computer along the
internet transmission network, courts have found that there are multiple "RAM copies" (and
therefore multiple reproductions) of the work created during the transmission. See Reese, supra
note 29, at 138-46 (describing and criticizing existing case law). The fact that these
intermediate fixations have no independent economic significance has not deterred copyright
owners from suing internet service providers for infringement, in addition to (or instead of) the
person making the transmission. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for
SubscriberCopyright Infringement,Enterprise Liability,and the FirstAmendment, 88 GEO. L.J.
1833, 1838-80 (2000). Copyright law has responded by limiting the liability of internet service
providers if they comply with a long list of restrictive conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 512. For an
evaluation of§ 512, see Yen, supra,at 1881-89.
33. See Reese, supra note 29, at 126-38. The material object in which the work is fixed
at the receiving end is typically a hard disk on a computer. While a hard disk is a "copy" (a
tangible object in which the work is fixed), this transaction does not involve the physical
transfer of the hard disk from one person to another, as contemplated by the statute.
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (concluding without
analysis that "LEXIS/NEXIS, by selling copies of the Articles through the NEXIS Database,
'distribute copies' of the Articles 'to the public by sale'); Getaped.com v. Cangemi, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 398, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases); cf Agee v. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 324-26 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that a satellite
transmission is not a "distribution," but reserving the question of Internet transmissions).
35.
17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
37. Note that since the public display right does not extend to sound recordings, 17
U.S.C. § 106(5), the definition of "display" applies only to a "copy" and not to a "phonorecord."
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require any additional fixation (such as a television transmission).
Indeed, because the first-sale doctrine expressly permits the owner of
a particular copy to display that copy "to viewers present at the place
where the copy is located, ' 39 infringement of the public display right
is effectively limited to the unauthorized transmission of an image of
the work to viewers at a remote location.4 °
The fourth exclusive right is the right "to perform the
copyrighted work publicly."' The word "perform" is defined without
reference to fixation.4 2 Consequently, a copyrighted work may be
infringed by an unauthorized, unfixed public performance of the
work, as well as by an unauthorized fixation (reproduction) or by an
unauthorized public distribution, public performance or public display
of one or more fixed copies.
III.

DERIVATIVE WORKS AND FIXATION

A. Text and Legislative History
The second exclusive right is the right "to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work., 43 The term "derivative
work" is defined in section 101 as follows:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other

38.

See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875,

879 (S.D. Fla. 1978) ("[T]he term 'display' includes showing a 'copy' of the work via television."), affdon othergrounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (11 th Cir. 1980).
39.

17 U.S.C. § 109(c).

40.
See Reese, supra note 29, at 88-92. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (D.N.J. 2002) (Internet transmission of images
constitutes a public display), affd on other grounds, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (display of copyrighted
photographs on computer bulletin board service).
41.
17 U.S.C. § 106(4). As explained above, Iam including within the ambit of this right
the sixth exclusive right, the right to perform a sound recording publicly "by means of digital
audio transmission." Id. § 106(6); see supra note 21.
42.
17 U.S.C. § 101 ("To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it,
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying
them audible.").
43.

Id. § 106(2).
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modifications which, as a whole,44 represent an original work of
authorship, is a "derivative work."
A lawfully-made derivative work is entitled to a separate copyright, a5
which extends only to the new material in the derivative work (as
opposed to the preexisting material).46
Like any other work, a derivative work must be fixed in a
tangible medium in order to be protected by copyright.4 7 Because the
same statutory definition applies both to copyrightable (authorized)
derivative works and infringing (unauthorized) derivative works, it
has been argued that the Act also requires that a derivative work be
fixed in order to be infringing. 48 The argument runs as follows: a
derivative work is a "work," and a work is not "created" until "it is
fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time. 4 9 Therefore,
"preparation of a derivative 'work' entails embodying the plaintiffs
copyrightable composition in some type of fixed form., 50 This
conclusion would be unassailable if section 106(2) provided the
exclusive right to create derivative works; however, that section uses
the undefined word "prepare" instead of the word "create."'" The
avoidance of the word "create" (which is defined in terms of fixation),
together with the absence of the terms "copies" and "phonorecords"
and the absence of any other reference to fixation, strongly suggests
that the right to prepare derivative works can
be infringed without any
52
additional fixation of the copyrighted work.
This conclusion is reinforced by the House Report to the 1976
Act, which indicates in several places that it is possible to have a

44.

Id. § 101.

45. Id. § 103(a).
46. Id. § 103(b).
47. This result follows because section 103 is not independent of section 102. Section
103(a) states that "[tihe subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes...
derivative works," 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (emphasis added); and section 102(a) expressly requires
fixation in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
48. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
8.09[A], at 8-142 (2003) ("Absent any compelling need to depart from the plain language of the
statute, both doctrine and policy incline to the same result .... [Therefore,] fixation should be
required to infringe the adaptation as well as the reproduction right.").
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for
the first time").
50. 2 NIMMER, supranote 48, § 8.09[A], at 8-140 n. 12.10.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
52. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at
194 (6th ed. 2000) ("The use of different words within related statutes generally implies that

different meanings were intended"). Students of legal history will be saddened to learn that the
Singer treatise no longer acknowledges its origins as a revision of Sutherland's famous treatise.
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"work of authorship" that is not fixed.53 More specifically, the House
Report expressly states that:
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works, specified
separately in clause (2) of section 106, overlaps the exclusive right
of reproduction to some extent. It is broader than that right,
however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies
or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work,
such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be
an infringement
even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible
54
form.

Similarly, the Register's 1965 Supplementary Report states:
[I]t is possible for a "derivative work" based on a copyrighted
work to be prepared without being fixed in a copy or
[phono]record; examples are ballets, pantomimes, and impromptu
performances. It is true that a derivative work would not itself be
protected by statutory copyright if it were not fixed in a "tangible
medium of expression" as required by section 102 of the bill.
Nevertheless, since there is no requirement under the definition in
section 101 that a "derivative work" be fixed in tangible form,
clause (2) of section 106 ... would make the preparation of
"derivative works" an infringement whether or not any copies or
phonorecords had been produced.55
Thus, both the text of the Act and its legislative history demonstrate
that Congress intended that a derivative work does not need to be
fixed in order to infringe.
Despite this seemingly straightforward conclusion, however,
consider the difficulties that would arise from accepting this literal
reading of the statute. If fixation is not required, that means that the
preparation of any unfixed derivative work, even only in one's own
mind, would be a prima facie infringement of the copyright in the
underlying work.56 If, in your mind's eye (or ear), you imagine an

53. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5666 ("It is
possible to have an 'original work of authorship' without having a 'copy' or 'phonorecord'
embodying it."); id. at 131, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5747 ("[S]ection 301(b) explicitly preserves
common law copyright protection for one important class of works: works that have not been
'fixed in any tangible medium of expression."').
54. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675.
55.
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, at
17 (May 1965).
56.
Cf. Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,
38 n.44 (1994):
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original arrangement of a popular song, or you imagine an altered
version of a copyrighted work of art, or you imagine your favorite
action movie with Johnny Depp in the lead role instead of Arnold
Schwarzenegger5 7 (or vice versa),5 8 under this interpretation of the
statute you would be a copyright infringer.59 While no one would be
aware of your transgression unless and until you revealed it to
someone else, and while it is all but certain that you would not be
sued even if the copyright owner became aware of such musings, "[a]
definition of derivative work that makes criminals out of art collectors
and tourists [and imaginative thinkers] is jarring despite [plaintiffs]
gracious offer not to commence civil litigation. 6 °
B. Case Law
1. Unfixed Modifications to a Copyrighted Work
Courts have shown some reluctance to accept the literal reading
of the Act that renders all unfixed derivative works infringing. A
prime example is Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc.,61 which involved the Game Genie, "a device manufactured by
Galoob that allows the player to alter up to three features of a
Nintendo video game." 62 The court explained that "[t]he Game Genie
functions by blocking the value for a single data byte sent by the
game cartridge to the central processing unit in the Nintendo

In theory, the police officer who succumbs to temptation and imagines the film
[INTERVIEW WITH THE VAMPIRE] as it might have looked if Daniel Day Lewis
had been cast in Tom Cruise's role may be violating the copyright owners'
exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) to prepare derivative works, since a
violation of the derivative work right requires no tangible embodiment
whatsoever.
57. See, e.g., THE TERMINATOR (Orion 1984).
58.

See, e.g., PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Disney

2003).
59. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22 (2001) ("[C]urrent law may make it
technically illegal to watch a movie and then imagine what it would have looked like if the
studio had cast some other actor in the leading role."); id. at 32 n.1(Right to prepare derivative
works "include[s] any adaptation in any form, regardless of whether that adaptation is ever
embodied in a permanent copy or communicated to another human being.").
60. See Lee v. AR.T.Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.). Such an
interpretation might also raise serious constitutional problems. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom
of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 39 (2001) (propounding a First

Amendment theory based on the freedom of imagination, because "in America no one can be
punished for daring to conceive or express an unauthorized idea.").
61.
964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. Id. at 967.
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Entertainment System and replacing it with a new value. 6 3 However,
as explained more fully in a previous, unpublished appeal:
The Game Genie makes no change in the data stored in the game
cartridge. Its interception and substitution of data takes place only
as long as it is attached to the game cartridge and the [Nintendo]
controller's power is on. The individual changes that the user
makes through entering codes therefore alter the audiovisual
display temporarily
but do not change it or the Nintendo game
64
permanently.
Because no fixed "copy" of the altered display was created, use of the
Game Genie did not violate the reproduction right. 65 The issue was
whether the altered screen display created when a Nintendo video
game cartridge was played using the 66Game Genie constituted an
infringing derivative work of that game.
The Galoob court expressly stated that "[o]ur analysis is not
controlled by the Copyright Act's definition of 'fixed' ....
The
67
definition of a 'derivative work' does not require fixation.,
Nonetheless, the court held that "[a] derivative work must incorporate
a protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form.' 68 The court
explained that "[t]he examples of derivative works provided by the
63. Id.
64. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 923 F.2d 862, No. 90-15936, 1991
WL 5171, at **1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 1991); see also Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967 ("The Game Genie
does not alter the data that is stored in the game cartridge. Its effects are temporary.").
65.
One might question this assumption today, by noting that the object code of the video
game had to be transferred into the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the Nintendo controller
(which is merely a special-purpose computer) in order to play the game; and that by intercepting
and substituting data obtained from the game cartridge, an altered version of the object code
would be utilized in RAM while the game was being played. Virtually all courts that have
addressed the issue have concluded that a RAM version of a work is sufficiently permanent or
stable to be considered "fixed" within the meaning of the Act, and therefore to constitute a
"copy" and to violate the reproduction right if unauthorized. See, e.g., Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). In this analysis, the RAM memory chip
itself is considered the tangible object in which the work is fixed-notwithstanding the fact that
the electronic version of the work would vanish if the flow of electricity to the RAM were
turned off. Despite widespread academic criticism of this view, see, e.g., Lemley, supra note
32, at 551 n.25 (collecting articles); Reese, supra note 29, at 138-46; Litman, supra note 56, at
40-42, Congress appears to have implicitly adopted the thesis that a RAM version of a work is a
"copy" by providing a number of express exceptions for various electronic versions of a work.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 117(c), 512(a). In Galoob, however, neither party argued that a copy of
the altered screen displays was fixed in RAM.
66. 964 F.2d at 969 ("[T]he only question before us is whether the audiovisual displays
created by the Game Genie are 'derivative works."').
67. Id.
at 967-68.
68. Id. at 967 (emphasis added).
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Act all physically incorporate the underlying work or works. The
Act's legislative history similarly indicates that 'the infringing work
must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.' 6 9
The court's conclusion is self-contradictory: the requirement of
"concrete or permanent" incorporation is nothing more than fixation
by another name. 70 In addition, its reasoning is weak. While it is true
that the examples of derivative works given in the statutory definition
all incorporate the underlying work in some way, it is meaningless to
say that they physically incorporate the underlying work without
further defining what "physically" means. If "physical" means
concrete or permanent, as the court suggests, the qualification is
simply untrue: a musical arrangement, for example, can exist in a live
performance without being preserved permanently (i.e., without being
fixed), as can a dramatization. If "physical" means "tangible," that is
simply another synonym for "fixed." 71 Moreover, the legislative
history states only that a derivative work must incorporate a portion
of the copyrighted work in some form; 72 it does not state that it must
incorporate the copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent
form.
Applying its new-found requirement of concrete or permanent
incorporation, the Galoob court concluded that:
The Game Genie merely enhances the audiovisual displays (or
underlying data bytes) that originate in Nintendo game cartridges.
The altered displays do not incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent form. Nintendo
argues that the Game Genie's displays are as fixed in the hardware
69.

Id, quoting 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675.

70.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression
)
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord... is sufficiently permanent or stable ....
(emphasis added); see also Edward G. Black and Michael H. Page, Add-On Infringements:
When Computer Add-Ons and PeripheralsShould (and Should Not) Be ConsideredInfringing
Derivative Works Under Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., and Other Recent
Decisions, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 615, 623 (1993) (referring to "[t]his apparently
self-contradictory requirement"); id. at 625 ("Having discarded the fixation requirement... [the
Ninth Circuit] found an independent fixation requirement of sorts built into the statutory
definition of derivative works."); 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[A] at 8-141 ("[E]ven after
rejecting fixation as an infringement prerequisite, the opinion several times slid back towards
fixation as a required standard.").
71.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression..
(emphasis added).
72.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675 ("[T]o
constitute a violation of section 106(2), the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form; for example, a detailed commentary on a work or a programmatic musical composition inspired by a novel would not normally constitute infringements
under this clause.").
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and software used to create them as Nintendo's original displays.
Nintendo's argument ignores the fact that the Game Genie cannot
produce an audiovisual display; the underlying display must be
produced by the Nintendo Entertainment System and game
cartridge. Even if we were to rely on the Copyright Act's
definition of 'fixed,' we would similarly conclude that the resulting
display is not 'embodied,' see 7317 U.S.C. §101, in the Game Genie.
It cannot be a derivative work.
It is clear that the court's requirement that a derivative work have
some "concrete or permanent" form affected the outcome.74 The
altered screen displays unquestionably incorporated the Nintendo
screen displays; indeed, they consisted of nothing but the Nintendo
screen displays behaving or moving in a different manner. But the
altered displays did not exist in any "concrete or permanent" form,
because they persisted only so long as the game was being played.
Circuit Judge Pamela Rymer concurred in the judgment only,
"for [the] reasons stated by the district court." 75 The district court
expressly required that a derivative work be fixed in order to be
infringing:
[T]his Court concludes that inherent in the concept of a "derivative
work" is the ability for that work to exist on its own, fixed and
transferable from the original work, i.e., having a separate '"form."
The Game Genie does not meet
that definition .... No
76
independent, fixed work is created.
The district court distinguished Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic
International,Inc.77 in which "the allegedly infringing product was a
printed circuit board which could be used to speed up the rate of
play... of one of plaintiff's video games ('Galaxian'), 78 as follows:
Midway's result, if not its analysis, appears to have turned on the
fact that the licensee arcade owner, not the copyright holder, was
making money from the public performance of the altered game, a
violation of section 106(4) ....

73. 964 F.2dat 968.
74. Indeed, the Galoob court repeated the "concrete or permanent" requirement, mantralike, four times in three pages. Id. at 967-69.
75. Id. at 972 (Rymer, J., concurring in the judgment).
76. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), af'd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
77. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
78. Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1290.
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The alleged infringer in this case is not a commercial licensee,
but rather a consumer utilizing the Game Genie for
noncommercial, private enjoyment. Such use neither generates a
fixed transferable copy of79the work nor exhibits or performs the
work for commercial gain.
This passage contains three potential grounds on which the
Midway case could be distinguished. The first, commercial gain
versus noncommercial use, does not affect whether a primafacie case
of infringement exists; rather, it is relevant (if at all) only to the fair
use doctrine. 80 The second, whether a "fixed transferable copy" is
made, is the issue that the Court of Appeals discussed at length. 81 The
third, whether the performance of the altered video display was a
public or a private performance, ostensibly also does not affect
whether an infringing derivative work has been "prepared., 82 The
district court, however, found the private character of the alleged
derivative work to be significant (and in the process anticipated a
current copyright controversy):
The Game Genie is a tool by which the consumer may temporarily
modify the way in which to play a video game, legally obtained at
market price. Any modification is for the consumer's own
enjoyment in the privacy of the home. Such a process is analogous
in purpose, if not in technology, to skipping portions of a book,
learning to speed read, fast-forwarding a video tape one has
purchased in order to skip portions one chooses not to see, or using
slow motion for the opposite reasons. None of these practices
permanently modifies or alters the original work, none produces a
separate work which can then be transferred in any way, none
replaces the original work, and83none deprives the copyright holder
of current or expected revenue.
In concluding that "none [of these practices] produces a separate
work," the district court appears to confuse the intangible work with
the tangible copy. The Game Genie does not contain or produce a

79. Id. at 1291.
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include--(l) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes ....).
81.
See supranotes 67-74 and accompanying text.
82. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (exclusive right "to prepare derivative works") with §
106(3) (exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public"), § 106(4) (exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly"), and § 106(5)
(exclusive right "to display the copyrighted work publicly") (emphases added).
83. 780 F. Supp. at 1291.
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separate copy (a material object) of the copyrighted work, which
could then be transferred; but whether the altered screen displays are
a separate work (an intangible intellectual creation) is the question to
be decided. And although the court found that the copyright holder
would not be deprived of current or expected revenue, the effect on
the market is supposed to be relevant, if at all, only to the fair use
doctrine. 84 Nonetheless, the analogy is an apt one, and it raises the
issue (to be discussed further in Part IV, below) whether the private
performance of an unfixed derivative work is, or should be,
infringing.
Finally, the district court also suggested that the Game Genie
could be characterized as instructions (in the form of software) 85 for
creating an altered screen display:
Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the copyright laws,
for a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how
to modify the rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game.
Once having purchased, for example, a copyrighted board game, a
consumer is free to take the board home and modify the game in
any way the consumer chooses, whether or not the method used
comports with the copyright holder's intent. The copyright holder,
having received expected value, has no further
control over the
86
consumer's private enjoyment of that game.
This passage again raises several potential issues that bear on the
question of whether a derivative work has been prepared. One is
whether a set of instructions for the private preparation of a derivative
work is itself a fixation of the resulting work. The district court
concludes that it is not. The second relates to the idea/expression
dichotomy, the fundamental principle that a copyright protects only
the expression of an idea, and not the idea, procedure, process, system
or method of operation itself.87 If the rules of a board game (or the
"behavior" of a video game) are considered part of the idea or method
of operation, then instructions or a device that alter only the
unprotected idea or method of operation, rather than its expression
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include... (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.").
85. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 101 ("A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.").
86. 780 F. Supp. at 1291.
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.").
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(such as the appearance of the board game, or the artwork of the video
game), should not be infringing. This analysis raises a very difficult
line-drawing problem, since the way in which a video game character
moves (for example) could be considered either part of the expression
or part of the idea. The third potential issue is the relationship of the
right to prepare derivative works to the first sale doctrine. Can a
person who has purchased a lawfully-made copy of a copyrighted
work permanently alter or modify that copy without the permission of
the copyright holder? That question has been addressed in a trio of
cases to which we now turn.
2. Mounting and Framing a Copyrighted Work of Art
Under the first-sale doctrine, if a person buys a painting, he or
she becomes the owner of that tangible object, 88 and he or she can
lend or resell that painting, 89 or display that painting publicly to
persons who are physically present, 90 without the permission of the
copyright owner. The buyer, however, does not acquire the right to
reproduce the copyrighted work. 91 This result is accomplished in the
statute by making the first-sale doctrine an express exception to the
distribution and display rights,92 but not to the reproduction right.
Likewise, the first-sale doctrine does not expressly apply to the
right to prepare derivative works. If a very crass person bought a
painting and painted a moustache on it, would doing so infringe the
copyright in the painting? We need not answer this specific question,
because in the case of a painting or other "work of visual art," the
author has the moral right of integrity provided in section 106A. 93
That section gives the author a non-transferable right "to prevent any
88. See id § 101 ("The term 'copies' includes the material object.., in which the work is
first fixed.").
89. See id. § 109(a).
90. Seeid § 109(c).
91. See id § 202 ("Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the
copyrighted work embodied in the object.").
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) ..
); §
109(c) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5) .... "). There is also a limited firstsale provision which permits the public performance and display of "an electronic audiovisual
game intended for use in coin-operated equipment" without the permission of the copyright
holder in the game. See id. § 109(e).
93. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights andFair Use, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33, 35 n.l (1997) ("It has become standard fare in moral-rights
conversation to discuss the painting of a mustache on the Mona Lisa."); see also Geri J.
Yonover, The "Dissing'"of Da Vinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp: Moral
Rights, Parody andFairUse, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 935 (1995).

2004]

COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIVE WORKS & FIXATION

1009

intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation" 94 and
provides a civil action to enjoin (or to recover damages for) any
violation of that right.95 However, the term "work of visual art" is
very narrowly defined: it applies only to a single original painting,
drawing, print, or sculpture, or "a still photographic image produced
for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed
by the author," or to a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer of any of
the above that are signed and consecutively numbered.96 We can
therefore remove the limited moral right provided by U.S. law from
the equation by changing our hypothetical to a photograph published
in a book. Suppose a person buys an illustrated catalog (published in
more than 200 copies) at a museum exhibition of an artist's work.
Can he or she paint a moustache on one of the photographs in the
catalog?
An initial reaction might be "of course"; after all, the book is a
tangible piece of personal property (a "copy"), and under the first-sale
doctrine, the person owns that copy and can do what he or she wants
with it. This was the reaction of the Seventh Circuit in Lee v. A.R. T.
Co., 97 in which the defendant purchased notecards bearing printed
works of art, mounted each notecard on a ceramic tile using an epoxy
resin, and sold the finished tiles.98 The court said:
Now one might suppose that this is an open and shut case under
the doctrine of first sale, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). A.R.T.
bought the work legitimately, mounted it on a tile, and resold what
it had purchased. Because the artist could capture the value of her
art's contribution to the finished product as part of the price for the
original transaction, the economic rationale for protecting an
adaptation as "derivative" is absent. See William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J.
Legal Studies 325, 353-57 (1989). An alteration that includes (or
consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic
significance. One work changes hands multiple times, 99exactly
what § 109(a) permits, so it may lack legal significance too.

94. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
95. See id. § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights ...of the author
as provided in section 106A(a)... is an infringer of the ... right of the author.").
96. Id. § 101. In the case of a sculpture, the limited-edition copies may bear an
identifying mark instead of a signature. Id.
97. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
98. Id. at 580.
99. Id. at 581.
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But the artist might reply: "Not so fast. The first-sale doctrine is only
an exception to the rights of public distribution and public display. It
does not provide any exception to the right to prepare derivative
works, and painting a moustache on the photograph is the preparation
of a derivative work."
The Ninth Circuit essentially agreed with this analysis in Mirage
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,' ° ° in which the defendant
purchased a book of prints by the artist Patrick Nagel and mounted
the individual pages in the same manner as in Lee.' °1 The Mirage
court held:
We recognize that, under the "first sale" doctrine. .. , appellant
can purchase a copy of the Nagel book and subsequently alienate
its ownership in that book. However, the right to transfer applies
only to the particular copy of the book which appellant has
purchased and nothing else. The mere sale of the book to the
appellant without a specific transfer by the copyright holder of its
exclusive right tolprepare derivative works, does not transfer that
right to appellant.
The question, therefore, was whether mounting the art print onto a
ceramic tile amounted to the preparation of a derivative work. Or, in
the more colorful language of the Seventh Circuit:
... Lee believes that affixing the art to the tile is "preparation," so
that A.R.T. would have violated § 106(2) even if it had dumped the
finished tiles into the Marianas Trench. For the sake of argument
we assume that this is so and ask 1whether
the card-on-a-tile is a
03
"derivative work" in the first place.
In Mirage, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the mounted prints
were derivative works:
What appellant has clearly done here is to make another version of
Nagel's art works, and that amounts to preparation of a derivative
100.
101.

856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Mirage court gave a more detailed explanation of the process:
Since 1984, the primary business of appellant has consisted of: 1) purchasing
artwork prints or books including good quality artwork page prints therein; 2)
gluing each individual print or page print onto a rectangular sheet of black plastic
material exposing a narrow black margin around the print; 3) gluing the black
sheet with print onto a major surface of a rectangular white ceramic tile; 4)
applying a transparent plastic film over the print, black sheet and ceramic tile
surface; and 5) offering the tile with artwork mounted thereon for sale in the
retail market.
Id. at 1342.
102. Id. at 1344.
103. Lee, 125 F.3d at 581.
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work. By borrowing and mounting the preexisting, copyrighted
individual art images without the consent of the copyright
proprietors.., appellant has prepared a derivative work and
infringed

the

subject

copyrights ....
The

language

"recast,

transformed or adapted" seems to encompass other alternatives
besides simple art reproduction. By removing the individual
images from the book and placing them on the tiles, perhaps the
appellant has not accomplished reproduction. We conclude,
though, that appellant has certainly recast or transformed the
individual images by incorporating them into its tile-preparing
process.104
This passage is remarkably devoid of analysis; the court simply
repeats its conclusion three times, as if doing so would make its
opinion more persuasive and comprehensible. The real question is:
what does "recast, transformed, or adapted" mean? The court
apparently did not believe that an "adaptation" had taken place. The
print (the tangible object) has been "transformed" in the sense that it
is now permanently bonded to a three-dimensional object, but the
work (the intangible image) has not been transformed at all; it "still
depicts exactly what it depicted" before it was mounted. 0 5 The literal
meaning of "recast" would be to reproduce or repair a sculpture (or
other metal object) by pouring molten metal into a mold; 10 6 a more
likely meaning in this context is "[t]o set down or present (ideas, for
example) in a new or different arrangement."' 1 7 Perhaps shuffling the
prints and presenting them in a different order would constitute a new
arrangement of those images and would infringe the copyright in the
collective work;10 8 but with respect to each individual copyrighted
image, how is mounting it on a tile a new "arrangement" of the
image? 10 9
104. 856 F.2d at 1343-44.
105. Lee, 125 F.3d at 582.
106. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1458 (4th ed.
2000) ("[t]o mold again"); id. at 289 (defining "cast" as "[t]o form (liquid metal, for example)
into a particular shape by pouring into a mold").
107. Id. at 1458.
108. A "collective work" is a species of "compilation"; and "[a] 'compilation' is a work
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original
work of authorship." 17 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2000). Under the Supreme Court's landmark opinion
in Feist Publ'ns,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the copyrightable element in
a compilation is the original selection or arrangement of preexisting materials.
109. Another definition of "recast" is "[t]o refashion, remodel, reconstruct (a thing, esp. a
literary work, a sentence, etc.); to invest with new form or character." 13 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 311 (2d ed. 1989). Using this definition, it is hard to see how mounting an image
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In yet another case involving the same process, Munoz v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 1t0 the same defendant argued that mounting
a print on a ceramic tile was no different from placing it in a frame.
The district court rejected this argument:
The court cannot agree that permanently affixing a notecard to a
ceramic tile is not recasting, transforming or adapting the original
art work. Placing a print or painting in a frame and covering it
with glass does not recast or transform the work of art. It is
commonly understood that this amounts to only a method of
display. Moreover, it is a relatively simple matter to remove the
print or painting and display it differently if the owner chooses to
do so. Neither of these things is true of the art work affixed to a
ceramic tile.'I
In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the outcome was controlled by its opinion in Mirage, and endorsing
the district court's distinction between mounting and framing." 12 But
in Lee, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with this conclusion:
No one believes that a museum violates § 106(2) every time it
changes the frame of a painting that is still under copyright,
although the choice of frame or glazing affects the impression the
art conveys, and many artists specify frames (or pedestals for
sculptures) in great detail .... Nonetheless, the [N]inth [C]ircuit
held, what A.R.T. does creates a derivative work because the
epoxy resin bonds the art to the tile. Our district judge thought this
a distinction without a difference, and we agree .... If the framing
process does not create a derivative work, then mounting art on a
tile, which serves as a flush frame, does not create a derivative
work. What is more, the [N]inth [C]ircuit erred in assuming that
normal means of mounting and displaying art are easily reversible.
A painting is placed in a wooden "stretcher" as part of the framing
process; this leads to some punctures (commonly tacks or staples),
may entail trimming the edges of the canvas, and may affect the
surface of the painting as well .... As a prelude to framing,
photographs, prints and posters may be mounted on stiff boards
on a ceramic tile "refashions, remodels or reconstructs" the image. Whether mounting an image
invests the image with "new form or character" is more of a metaphysical inquiry.
110. 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), affd mem., 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished opinion availableat 1994 WL 574156).
111.
829 F. Supp. at 314.

112.
1994 WL 574156, at **2 ("A.R.T.'s position ignores the distinction drawn in this
circuit between conventional framing and A.R.T.'s ceramic tiling process which the district
court properly held to constitute a derivative work."). Despite the language in the court's
unpublished opinion, the "distinction" to which the court refers was not mentioned in Mirage

and did not exist in any circuit precedent prior to the Munoz decision.
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using wax sheets, but sometimes glue or
another more durable
13
substance is employed to create the bond. 1
As a practical matter, the disagreement between Lee, on the one
hand, and Mirage and Munoz, on the other, is a dispute about money:
should the artist receive a cut of the profits when a previously sold
work is mounted and resold at a higher price? Under the first-sale
doctrine, the artist gets nothing if the work is resold at a higher price
without remounting; if anything, the extra materials and labor
involved in the mounting process justify giving the profit to the
improver, who has added value, rather than to the artist, who has
already received compensation for the authorized copy.114
More fundamentally, however, this trio of cases exposes a flaw
in the Copyright Act's treatment of privately prepared derivative
works. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, "if Lee is right about what
'prepared' means, then the derivative work is 'prepared' when the art
is mounted; what happens later is not relevant, because the violation
of the § 106(2) right has already occurred."' 1 5 Under this reading,
even drawing a moustache on your own copy of a photograph, or
writing notes in the margins of your own copy of a book, would be an
infringement. As the Seventh Circuit observed:
We asked at oral argument what would happen if a purchaser
jotted a note on one of the notecards, or used it as a coaster for a
drink, or cut it in half, or if a collector applied his seal (as is
common in Japan); Lee's counsel replied that such changes
prepare derivative works, but that as a practical matter artists
would not file suit. A definition of derivative work that makes
criminals out of art collectors and tourists is jarring
despite Lee's
6
gracious offer not to commence civil litigation.''

113.

Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997).

114.
One commentator suggests that this analysis will hold true only when the derivative
use "is a customary or reasonably expected use" of the underlying work. See Amy B. Cohen,
When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?, 17 CARDOZO

ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 658 (1999). When, on the other hand, "the derivative use was not
customary or reasonably expected and.., therefore there was no realistic opportunity for the
copyright owner to receive compensation for that use," Cohen would impose liability. Id.This
analysis does not square with the incentive theory of copyright, because if the derivative use was
not customary or reasonably expected, it could not have played any role in the author's decision
to create and publish the work. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592
(1994) ("[T]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop.").
115.

125 F.3d at 580-581.

116.

Id.at582.
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Moreover, this flaw cannot be rectified by invoking the concept of
"fixation." Mounting a print on a ceramic tile with an epoxy resin
could be considered a "fixation" in the sense that the mount is
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived ... for a
period of more than transitory duration."' 1 7 Likewise, painting a
moustache on a photo or writing notes in the margin of a book is a
permanent change. But in each of these cases, no reproduction has
taken place; the modification is accomplished without any new
fixation of the underlying work, or any portion of the underlying
work.
Before offering an alternative interpretation of the Act that may
resolve some of these problems, we must consider one more Ninth
Circuit opinion involving the right to prepare derivative works.
3. Software That Modifies a Copyrighted Work
Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc.1 t 8 involved a computer game called
Duke Nukem 3D ("D/N-3D"), described by Judge Kozinski as
follows:
Players explore a futuristic city infested with evil aliens and other
hazards. The goal is to zap them before they zap you, while
searching for the hidden passage to the next level. The basic game
comes with twenty-nine levels, each with
19 a different combination
of scenery, aliens, and other challenges.'
Judge Kozinski also described how the game operates in detail:
The game consists of three separate components: the game engine,
the source art library and the MAP files .... In order to create the
audiovisual display for a particular level, the game engine invokes
the MAP file that corresponds to that level. Each MAP file
contains a series of instructions that tell the game engine (and
through it, the computer) what to put where. For instance, the
MAP file might say scuba gear goes at the bottom of the screen.
The game engine then goes to the source art library, finds the
image of the scuba gear, and puts it in just the right place on the
screen. The MAP file describes the level in painstaking detail, but
it does not actually contain any of the copyrighted art itself;

117. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of"fixed"). It doesn't make much sense, however,
to speak of a mounted print being able to be "reproduced" or "otherwise communicated." It is
the intangible image that communicates and that can be reproduced; mounting the image doesn't
reproduce the image or communicate anything new.
118.
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 1109.
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everything that appears on the screen actually comes from the art
library. 12
The game comes with a "Build Editor" which allows users to build
new levels by creating new MAP files.12' FormGen encouraged users
to post new levels to the Internet, 122 but specified that any new levels
"must be offered... solely for free."' 123 Micro Star downloaded 300
user-created MAP files from the Internet, burned them onto a CD, and
24
sold the resulting product under the name "Nuke It" ("N/I"). 1
FormGen contended that "the audiovisual displays generated
when D/N-3D is run in conjunction with the N/I CD MAP files are
derivative works."' 125
In assessing this claim, Judge Kozinski
accepted as a given that "a derivative work must exist in a 'concrete
or permanent form,' and must substantially incorporate protected
material from the preexisting work.' ' 126 Micro Star argued that its CD
was a more advanced version of the Game Genie: it had to be run in
conjunction with a D/N-3D game, and it drew upon the source art
library to create modified audiovisual displays. The court, however,
found Galoob distinguishable:
[W]hereas the audiovisual displays created by Game Genie were
never recorded in any permanent form, the audiovisual displays
generated by D/N-3D from the N/I MAP files are in the MAP files
themselves. In Galoob, the audiovisual display was defined by the
original game cartridge, not by the Game Genie; no one could
possibly say that the data values inserted by the Game Genie
described the audiovisual display. In the present case the
audiovisual display that appears on the computer monitor when a
N/I level is played is described - in exact detail - by a N/I MAP
file.
This raises the interesting question whether an exact, down to
the last detail, description of an audiovisual display ...counts as a
permanent or concrete form for purposes of Galoob. We see no
reason it shouldn't. What, after all, does sheet music do but
describe in precise detail the way a copyrighted melody
sounds? ...Similarly, the N/I MAP files describe the audiovisual

120.

Id.atII10.

121. Id.at1109.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1113 (alteration in original).
124. Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998).
125. Id.atlIlO.
126. Id. (citations omitted).
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to play
display that is to be generated
127 when the player chooses
levels.
N/I
the
using
D/N-3D
One may question the assertion in the second sentence quoted above:
while perhaps no one could say that "the data values inserted by the
Game Genie described the audiovisual display," one could certainly
say that those values described certain aspects of the audiovisual
display. Likewise, in Micro Star certain aspects of the audiovisual
display were predetermined and other aspects could be altered, even
though the technology in Micro Star permitted a much greater degree
of modification than did the technology in Galoob.
There is, however, a more significant distinction: the degree of
permanence or fixation. In Galoob, the altered data values (the
instructions for changing the audiovisual display) were entered by the
user, so that the altered audiovisual displays disappeared at the end of
the game. 128 "Of course, they could be reconstructed, but only if the
next player chose to reenter the same codes."'129 In Micro Star,
however, the altered audiovisual displays (or, more precisely,
software instructions for creating the altered displays) were fixed on a
CD-ROM in the form of MAP files.
Judge Kozinski illustrated this point with a "low-tech" example:
Imagine a product called the Pink Screener, which consists of a big
piece of pink cellophane stretched over a frame. When put in front
of a television, it makes everything on the screen look pinker.
Someone who manages to record the programs with this pink cast
(maybe by filming the screen) would have created an infringing
derivative work. But the audiovisual display observed by a person
watching television through the Pink Screener is not a derivative
the modified image in any
work because it does not incorporate
30
permanent or concrete form. 1

127. Id. at 1111-12. The Micro Star opinion uses the word "display" in its ordinary lay
sense, meaning any image displayed on the screen of a computer monitor. The Copyright Act,
on the other hand, has a more restrictive definition of "display": "in the case of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Since
the images of a video game are shown sequentially, rather than nonsequentially, in the language
of the Act the modified audiovisual displays would be a "performance" rather than a "display."
Id.(To "perform" an audiovisual work is "to show its images in any sequence.").
128. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), affd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
129.

Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111 (referring to Galoob).

130.

Id. at I IIIn.4.
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Of course, this hypothetical just highlights the fact that the Ninth
Circuit is requiring that a derivative work be fixed in a tangible
medium, even if that is not what they are calling it.
Another distinction between the two cases may also be drawn.
The Game Genie allowed the player to alter the display of any game
that could be played on the Nintendo Entertainment System,13
whereas the MAP files reproduced and distributed by Micro Star
could only be used with Duke Nukem 3D. 132 The court in Micro Star
found this point significant, indicating in dicta that "[i]f another game
could use the MAP files to tell the story of a mousy fellow who
travels through a beige maze, killing vicious saltshakers with paperclips, then the MAP files would not incorporate the protected
expression
of D/N-3D because they would not be telling a D/N-3D
13 3
story.'

This passage, however, misconstrues FormGen's basic argument
that it is the modified audiovisual displays themselves (an unfixed
private performance), not the MAP files per se (fixed instructions for
generating the displays), that are derivative works.' 34 Thus, even if
Micro Star's MAP files could be used with other games, FormGen
could still argue that Micro Star was contributorily liable for
reproducing and distributing software that enabled users to generate
and view the modified displays. Micro Star, in turn, might be able to
argue that its MAP files were "capable of substantial non-infringing
uses,"' 135 at least if they could be used with games whose copyright
owners did not object. 136 But such non-specific MAP files would be
just as "fixed" as MAP files that could only be used with one game.
The Game Genie is yet one more step removed from Judge
Kozkinski's hypothetical non-specific MAP files. The Game Genie is
a tool for temporarily implementing instructions for modifying an
audiovisual display, whereas the MAP files are the instructions
themselves. If someone had distributed plug-in cartridges for the

131. Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1288 ("The Game Genie can function in combination with
any NES-compatible game cartridge.").
132.

Micro Star, 154F.3dat 1112n.5.

133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 1110 ("According to FormGen, the audiovisual displays generated when D/N-

3D is run in conjunction with the N/l CD MAP files are derivative works.").
135.
136.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
Cf Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1288 ("It is not known whether the nontestifying

Nintendo-licensees or the eight nonlicensed producers of NES-compatible games object or
consent to the use of the Game Genie with their copyrighted games ...").
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Nintendo system that had altered data values already stored in them
("fixed"), the result in Galoob probably would have been different.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION
As we have seen, there is reason to question the literal
interpretation of the statute that makes all unfixed derivative works
infringing, if for no other reason than it is absurd to suggest that
merely imagining a derivative work is infringing. And yet few of us
would question that some unfixed derivative works, such as a live
public performance of an adaptation of a novel, should be infringing.
How should this dilemma be resolved? As demonstrated above, the
Ninth Circuit has attempted to resolve it by requiring that a derivative
work incorporate a portion of the underlying work in some "concrete
or permanent form," a requirement which appears to be nothing more
than fixation by another name.1 37 Such a transparent semantic dodge
is unsatisfactory, and it contradicts the passage in the House Report
which states that "the preparation of a derivative work... may be
an
' 38
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form."
To properly resolve the question, we must examine the purpose
of eliminating the fixation requirement for derivative works. This
requires a brief look at the history of the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works.
Under the 1790 and 1831 Acts, the copyright owner was given
the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, and vend" the work, and
to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies. 139
Courts
construed these rights narrowly; an unauthorized German translation
of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," for example, was held not to be an
infringement. 140
In 1856, Congress added a right of public
137.

See supranotes 67-72 and accompanying text.

138.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675.

139.

Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); Copyright Act of 1831, ch.

16, §§ 1,6, 4 Stat. 436-37 (1831).
140.

See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). By contrast,

the scope of infringement in images was somewhat broader. In 1802, Congress prohibited the
copying of prints "in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main
design." Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 172. The 1831 Act both extended and limited

the reach of this provision, prohibiting the copying of any print, engraving, map, chart or
musical composition (but not any book) "either on the whole, or by varying, adding to, or
diminishing the main design, with intent to evade the law." Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 7,
4 Stat. 438. This language was further refined in 1870 to prohibit copying "either in whole or in
part, or by varying the main design with intent to evade the law." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §
100, 16 Stat. 214. In 1891, dramatic compositions and photographs were given the benefit of

this provision. Act of Mar. 1, 1891, ch. 565, § 8, 26 Stat. 1109. This language was not carried
forward in the 1909 Act.
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performance in dramatic compositions. 141

In the 1870 general
revision, Congress provided for the first time that "authors may
reserve the right to dramatize or translate their own works."' 142 In
1897, the right of public performance was expanded to include
musical works. 14 3 Finally, in the 1909 Act, a broad derivative work
right was created:
[The author] shall have the exclusive right:

(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work;
to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a
novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or
adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete,
144 execute, and finish it
if it be a model or design for a work of art.
This history suggests that the principal purpose behind the right to
prepare derivative works was to expand the scope of the reproduction

and public performance rights to include adaptations and other new
versions of copyrighted works. The "translation" and "conversion"
rights provided in the 1909 Act, for example, appear to relate to the
right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work; while the
"dramatization" right and the "arrangement" right for musical works
appear to relate to the public performance right. Indeed, a 1961
Report of the Register of Copyrights stated "[plerhaps section 1(b) is
unnecessary," but it recommended retaining a separate right to make
new versions "to avoid any doubt" and to ensure that the right
145
covered "all classes of works and all forms of new versions."'
141. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 139 ("The sole right also to act, perform, or
represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public
place during the whole period for which the copyright is obtained.").
142. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212. In 1891, this was rephrased to state
that authors "shall have the exclusive right to dramatize or translate any of their works." Act of
Mar. 1, 1891, ch. 565, § 1, 26 Stat. 1107.
143. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349,
35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78 (1909)
144. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075. For musical works, another
section of the Act reiterated the right "to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody
of it." Id. § l(e); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78 (1909).
145.

COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
Similarly, the Register's

GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (July 1961).

1965 Report stated:
It could be argued that, since the concept of "reproduction" is broad enough to
include adaptations and recast versions of all kinds, there is no need to specify a
separate right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."
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It appears that the reason the right to prepare derivative works
was drafted without any reference to fixation was to make sure that
public performances of derivative works would be covered. The
House Report to the 1976 Act gives three examples of unfixed
derivative works: "the preparation of a derivative work, such as a
ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form." 14 6 All three
examples are public performances of a derivative work. There is
nothing to suggest that Congress intended to prohibit the private
performance of a derivative work.
This suggests an alternative interpretation of the right to prepare
derivative works that addresses all of the concerns expressed by
Congress while avoiding some of the more obvious problems
discussed above. My interpretation is simply this: the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works is not independent of the other four
exclusive rights, but is infringed only in conjunction with at least one
of the other four exclusive rights. The right to prepare derivative
works is infringed only when a modified version of a copyrighted
work is reproduced, distributed to the public, or publicly performed or
displayed; if the allegedly infringing activity is the private
performance of a derivative work, without any fixation of that
derivative work, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works is not
violated.
This interpretation gives meaning to the apparent intent of
Congress that fixation is not required to infringe the right to prepare
derivative works, while avoiding the absurd result that the right to
prepare derivative works may be infringed merely by imagining an
altered version of a work. In order for that altered version to infringe,
more than mere imagination is required: either it must be fixed in
some tangible medium (violating the reproduction right, and creating
a "copy" which can then be publicly distributed or displayed), or it
of one of these additional
must be publicly performed. In the absence
47
activities, no infringement has occurred. 1

As indicated in the 1961 Report, however, this has long been looked upon as a
separate exclusive right, and to omit any specific mention of it would be likely to
cause uncertainty and misunderstanding.
1965 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 17.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675.
146.
A similar interpretation is set forth in 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[A], at 8-138
147.
("[I]f the right to make derivative works... has been infringed, then there is necessarily also an
infringement of either the reproduction or performance rights."); id. at 8-139 ("If a derivative
work is not fixed in copies or phonorecords, it will not constitute an infringement of the
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There are some possible objections to this interpretation. First,
the statute says that the copyright owner "has the exclusive right to do
and to authorize any of the following,"' 148 which certainly suggests
that the drafters intended the exclusive rights which follow to be
independent of one another. This is seemingly confirmed by the
House Report, which states:
The first three clauses of section 106. .. extend to every kind of
copyrighted work. The exclusive rights encompassed by these
clauses, though closely related, are independent; they can generally
be characterized as rights of copying, recording, adaptation, and
publishing. A single act of infringement may violate all of these
rights at once, as where a publisher reproduces, adapts, and sells
copies of a person's copyrighted work as part of a publishing
venture. Infringement takes place when any one of the rights is
violated: where, for example, a printer reproduces copies without
selling them or a retailer149sells copies without having anything to do
with their reproduction.
This passage states that each of the exclusive rights is "independent"
of the others and may be violated by itself. But the example given is
that the reproduction and distribution rights may be violated
separately; there is no example given in which the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works is violated without also violating at least one
of the other four rights. The references elsewhere in the legislative
history to unfixed derivative works all involve public
performances;' 50 this, combined with Congressional intent not to
prohibit private performances and displays generally,' 5 ' should be
sufficient to trump a generalization drawn from a different context.
As for the statutory language, while plain language interpretation is to
be favored, 152 it ought not to be used to contradict other portions of
the statute 53 (like those that prohibit only public performances or
reproduction right in the pre-existing work, but it may nevertheless infringe the [public]
performance right therein.").
148.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (emphasis added).
149. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5674-75.
150. See supranote 146 and accompanying text.
151. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5677 ("Although
any act by which the initial performance or display is transmitted, repeated, or made to recur
would itself be a 'performance' or 'display' under the bill, it would not be actionable as an
infringement unless it were done 'publicly,' as defined in section 101.").
152.

See generally 2A SINGER, supranote 52, § 46.01.

153. See 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.05 at 170-71 ("[A] 'clear and unambiguous'
statutory provision.., is one having a meaning that is not contradicted by other language in the
same act."); Id. § 46.01 at 125-26 ("One who questions the application of the plain meaning rule
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displays),154 or to lead to absurd results 155 (like prohibiting merely
imagining a derivative work).' 56 One way to reach the desired result
would be to interpret the word "prepared" to mean "reproduced,
This
distributed, publicly performed, or publicly displayed."
interpretation requires something more formal than mere imagination,
but it avoids direct reference to the statutorily-defined terms "created"
or "fixed."
Another objection is that the right to prepare derivative works is
redundant if it is interpreted to be violated only in conjunction with
one of the other four rights, and it is a general canon of statutory
construction that redundancy is to be avoided.157 One answer to this
objection is that Congress specifically intended redundancy in this
particular instance: as noted above, the Register of Copyrights stated
that a separate right might be "unnecessary," but recommended its
inclusion "to avoid any doubt."'158 More fundamentally, in the
absence of a derivative work right the other four rights could have
been construed to be limited to versions which were closely similar
to, or nearly identical with, the original fixed version of the work. A
dependent right to prepare derivative works therefore serves the
important purpose of ensuring that the scope of the other four rights

to a provision of an act must show... that some other section of the act expands or restricts its
meaning.").
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) (exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work
154.
publicly"); Id. § 106(5) (exclusive right "to display the copyrighted work publicly") (emphases
added).
See 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.01 at 128; In re Trans-Alaska Pipeline Rate
155.
Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) ("This Court, in interpreting the words of a statute, has some
scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where
acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd results.") (internal quotes omitted); Nixon v.
Mo. Mun. League, No. 02-1238 (U.S. S.Ct. Mar. 24, 2004), slip. op. at 12, 2004 WL 573799, at
*8 ("[This] Court will not construe a statute in a manner that leads to absurd or futile results.").
See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of
157.
statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.") (internal
quotations omitted); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S.Ct.
2041, 2048 (2003) ("A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of
course to be avoided."); 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.06 at 181.
156.

158.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, §
8.09[A], at 8-138 to 8-138.1 ("The best indication of the superfluity of the adaptation right lies
in the fact that those infrequent cases under the 1909 Act that invoked the comparable right to
"make any other version" generally also invoked an alternative ground of infringing copying.")
(citing cases).
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is "substantially
includes all versions which contain expression that 59
similar" to protected expression in the original work.1
Another objection would be to say that such questions can be
adequately dealt with through the fair-use doctrine. 160 It is true that
the fair use doctrine can be expected to insulate many, perhaps even
most, personal uses from infringement.16' However, the fair use
doctrine is already asked to carry a tremendous portion of the policy
considerations present in U.S. copyright law.' 6 2 In addition, the fair
use doctrine, like any multi-factor balancing test, is inherently
unpredictable; the lack of clarity in its application leads to a "chilling
as
effect" that may deter others from engaging in activities (such
63
desirable.
socially
are
that
art)
of
works
mounting and framing

2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[A], at 8-138 ("[Ulnless the [alleged derivative
159.
work] is substantially similar to its forbear, it remains nonactionable.").
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work... is not an
infringement of copyright."). The statute lists several examples of purposes that may qualify as
fair uses, and four factors that courts should consider in determining whether a particular use is
fair.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984)
161.
(holding that home videotaping of broadcast television for time-shifting purposes is a fair use);
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969-72 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding in the alternative that use of the Game Genie for private home enjoyment was a fair
use). But see United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
("[T]here is as yet no generally recognized right to make a copy of a protected work, regardless
of its format, for personal noncommercial use.").
162.
For example, the fair use doctrine has been invoked to determine the legality of home
videotaping for time-shifting purposes, educational and corporate photocopying, news reporting,
parody and satire, use of letters and film clips in biographies and documentaries, fan and
collector's guides, digital sampling, decompilation and reverse engineering, comparative
advertising, and internet search engines. See generally 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 13.05; 2
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT (2004 ed.), Chapter 10.
Cf.Rubenfeld, supra note 60, at 17 n.75 ("[Tihe vagueness of the fair use doctrine
163.
must surely have the proverbial 'chilling effect' on some protected speech."); Kenneth D.
Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1, 10-11 (1999) ("The problem with fair use is that a single case--even a case
from a lower court-can have chilling effects on matters of great public interest ....[Many
individuals] are too fearful of infringements and litigation to identify and assert a claim of fair
use."); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 269
(1997) ("It is difficult to predict in advance whether a particular use will be pronounced fair if
challenged by the author of the copied work. This uncertainty of outcome of fair use litigation
produces a 'chilling' effect that may on occasion stifle the use altogether. Merely the threat of
litigation can have a serious chilling effect on defendants of modest means. A would-be user
who is financially unable to fight a fair use battle will avoid subjecting herself to the possibility
of defending such a lawsuit by avoiding the use altogether. This chilling effect, by inhibiting
uses that would increase public access to works of authorship, directly undermines copyright's
goal.").
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V. THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION APPLIED
To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed alternative
interpretation, consider how it would operate in each of the four
hypothetical situations outlined in Part I of this article.
A. Arranginga Musical Work
Suppose a person sits down at a piano and creates a new
arrangement of a popular song. This would not by itself be an
infringement of the copyright, because the person has not yet fixed
the new arrangement in a tangible medium. Later, the person
performs the new arrangement for some friends in the privacy of his
home. This would also not be an infringement of the copyright,
because it is not a public performance of the new arrangement. This
result makes sense; the person clearly would not be infringing if he or
she performed the work privately without modification;1 64 the fact
there was a modification, by itself, should not be deemed to make the
private performance infringing.
It also makes sense from an
evidentiary point of view: once the new arrangement is fixed in a
tangible medium, the reproduction right is violated, and there is
tangible evidence of the violation. Similarly, if a public performance
takes place, evidence of the infringing performance will be easily
obtained. We don't have to worry about copyright owners infiltrating
a private party in someone's home or deposing the arranger's family
and friends to obtain evidence of copyright infringement.
B. Mounting and Framinga Copyrighted Work
Suppose a person cuts a photograph out of a book, mounts it
upon a ceramic tile, and displays the mounted photo in her home. We
still have the question of whether the mounting process has "recast,
transformed, or adapted" the photo, within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. 165 Most commentators agree with the Seventh Circuit
that it does not. 166 But under the proposed interpretation, it doesn't
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly")
(emphasis added); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "publicly" as "at a place open to the public or at
any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered," or by transmission). Just how many persons is a "substantial
number" or a "normal circle" is open to interpretation. See Daniel Cantor, How Many Guests
Must Attend a Wedding Reception Before ASCAP Shows Up? Or, What Are the Limits of the
Definition of Perform "Publicly" Under 17 U.S.C. § 101?, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 79 (2003).
165. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 3.03[B][1] at 3-16 to 3-17; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 162, § 5.3 at 5:84 to 5:84-1.
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matter: there has been no reproduction, because there has been no new
fixation of the copyrighted work; 167 and there has been no public
distribution or public display of the mounted work.
This
interpretation of the Copyright Act makes sense, because it prevents
what the Seventh Circuit found "jarring": an interpretation of the Act
that makes criminals (or at least infringers) out of art collectors and
tourists. 168

What if the person places a transparent piece of pink plastic over
the photograph before displaying it? The work that is perceived by
the viewer is now different; it has a pink tint to it. But even assuming
that this modification was "original" enough to qualify as a derivative
work, again it would not be infringing, because there has been no new
fixation of the copyrighted work, and hence no reproduction; 169 and
because there has not been any public display or public distribution of
the pink-tinted photo. The same would be true if the person painted
the photo with pink watercolor instead of covering it with pink
plastic, or if the person used several photos cut out of magazines or
art books to make a collage.
A more difficult question is posed when the person wants to
publicly display or sell the modified photo. If the photo is not
modified, it may be publicly displayed and resold under the first-sale
doctrine, because it is a copy "lawfully made under this title."' 170 How
should we analyze the sale when the photo has been modified? There
are three possibilities.

167.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (exclusive right "to reproduce the work in copies or
phonorecords") (emphasis added); Id. § 101 (defining "copies" as "material objects ...in which

a work is first fixed"); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (Right of reproduction is "the right to produce a
material object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed
form."). In this case, the alleged infringer has not produced a material object; he or she has
merely modified an existing material object. In addition, the alleged infringer has not
duplicated, transcribed, imitated or simulated the copyrighted work, an intangible image which
has been left unaltered. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (distinguishing between the work and a tangible
copy of the work).
168. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997).
169. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (the "Pink
Screener").
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title ...is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."); Id. § 109(c) ("[T]he owner
of a particular copy lawfully made under this title... is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly ...to viewers present at the place where the copy
is located.").
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First, we could impose the Ninth Circuit's "concrete or
permanent" form requirement,171 which would condemn the photo
that is painted pink but would permit the photo which is simply
displayed under pink plastic. This option seems to elevate form over
substance, and it suffers from the problem of imposing a requirement
("concrete or permanent form") that does not appear to be in the
statute.
Second, we could say that although the original work could be
publicly displayed and resold, the modified work cannot be publicly
displayed or resold without the permission of the copyright owner,
because the first-sale doctrine does not apply to the right to prepare
derivative works. 172 This would avoid inconsistent treatment since
both the pink-washed and the pink-framed photos would be treated
the same, but it would prevent a person who creates home arts-andcrafts out of lawfully purchased copies of copyrighted works from
reselling them, which does not seem to be in the public interest of
encouraging creativity.
Third, under the proposed alternative interpretation, we could
say that since the right to prepare derivative works is not infringed
except in conjunction with one of the other four rights, and since the
first-sale doctrine permits the buyer to publicly display and resell his
or her own copy of the photo, this conduct is simply not actionable.
This result makes the most sense, because it permits buyers of
lawfully-made copies to reap the fruits of their own creativity in
modifying the purchased copy; and it permits the copyright owner to
reap the reward for his or her contribution to the finished product
because he or she gets paid when the lawfully-authorized copy is sold
in the first place.' 73 Another way to reach the same result would be
for Congress to amend the first-sale doctrine to expressly include
modifications to a lawfully-purchased copy that do not result in any
reproduction of the copyrighted work. While such an amendment
would solve the specific problem present in Mirage and Lee, it would
not solve the larger problem of unfixed derivative works generally.
The fair use doctrine would still be required to meet one
variation on this hypothetical: the Internet resale. In order to sell the
171.

See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110.

172. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3)"); Id. §
109(c) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5)").
173. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 581 ("Because the artist could capture the value of her art's
contribution to the finished product as part of the price for the original transaction, the economic
rationale for protecting an adaptation as 'derivative' is absent ....
An alteration that includes
(or consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic significance.").
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work over the Internet, the craftsperson would have to display a
photograph of it on the Internet. This would violate the public display
right, because the first-sale doctrine only applies to displaying a
particular copy to persons who are physically present at the place
where the copy is located. 174 It would also violate the reproduction
right, because any electronic copy of the work (such as a digital
photograph) would be a "reproduction." 175 Consequently, the
proposed alternative interpretation would not shield the craftsperson
in this instance. But the fair use doctrine can strike the appropriate
balance in such a situation. A high-resolution photograph of the
modified work, permanently displayed on a website, would operate as
a substitute for the copyrighted work itself, or for lawfully-authorized
derivative works, so a finding of infringement would be
appropriate.176 But a thumbnail photograph of the modified work,
temporarily displayed on an auction
site, would not operate as a
77
substitute, and should be permitted. 1
C. Modifying a Video Game
Suppose a company creates an electronic device that alters the
display of a popular video game. A teenager plays the video game in
his home while using the device.
In this case there is no
infringement, not because the altered screen display does not
incorporate the original audiovisual work in some "concrete or
permanent" form,' 78 but because there has been no reproduction,
public distribution, public performance or public display of the altered
video game. No distribution has occurred, because there has been no
"sale or other transfer of ownership" nor any "rental, lease or lending"
of the game. 179 Playing the game at home is a performance rather

174. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c).
175. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Tex.
1997); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Nev.
1998) ("The prevailing view therefore seems to be that the digitization or input of any
copyrighted material, whether it be computer code or visual imagery, may support a finding of
infringement .. ").Although both of these cases rely on the controversial doctrine of "RAM
copies," see supra note 65, displaying a photograph on the Internet would generally involve a
more permanent means of electronic storage, such as a hard disk.
176. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft, Inc., 280 F.3d 934, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion
withdrawn and superseded, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the original opinion in
Kelly was withdrawn, and can therefore no longer be cited as precedent, its reasoning on this
point appears to be sound.
177. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821-22.
178. See supranotes 67-72 and accompanying text.
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
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than a display,180 but it is not a "public" performance; 18' so the only
remaining question is whether there has been a reproduction. While
the computer program that operates the video game has been copied
into RAM, 82 and while that computer program has been modified by
the device, this use would appear to fall within the exemption
provided in section 1I7(a)(1) for RAM copies, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in con unction with
a machine and that it is used in no other manner ....

There are two legal questions concerning the interpretation of this
section. First, what does "an essential step" mean? Any computer
program must be copied into RAM for the computer to work. 184 With
regard to adaptations, must the adaptation itself be the essential step,
i.e., the computer program won't work unless it is adapted?' Or is it
sufficient that the RAM copy is essential for the adapted computer
program to work (which would permit adaptations like those
permitted to be made in Galoob)? 186 This issue was raised in Galoob
180. See id. § 101 (definition of "performance").
181. Id. (definition of "publicly").
182. See supra note 65.
183.
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(l).
184. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 600 n.1 (9th Cir.
2000).
185. This limitation is suggested by certain language in CONTU Report, which effectively
constitutes the legislative history of Section 117. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 13 (1978) ("CONTU
Report"), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/Chapter3.pdf ("Because of a
lack of complete standardization among programming languages and hardware in the computer
industry, one who rightfully acquires a copy of a program frequently cannot use it without
adapting it to that limited extent which will allow its use in the possessor's computer. The
copyright law.., should no more prevent such use than it should prevent rightful possessors
from loading programs into their computers. Thus, a right to make those changes necessary to
enable the use for which it was both sold and purchased should be provided.").
186. This more expansive reading also finds support in the CONTU Report. See id at 13
("The conversion of a program from one higher-level language to another to facilitate use would
fall within this right, as would the right to addfeatures to the program that were not present at
the time of lawful acquisition.") (emphasis added). See Foresight Resources Corp. v.
Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1009-10 (D. Kan. 1989) (relying on this language); cf Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Section 117... contains no
language to suggest that the copy it permits must be employed for a use intended by the
copyright owner.").
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at the preliminary injunction stage but was not resolved, 187 as the case
was decided on other grounds. Second, this statute implicates the
issue of whether the purchaser of a computer program is an "owner"
of a copy of that program, or merely a "licensee," as various end-user
license agreements ("EULAs"), including shrink-wrap and click-on
licenses, assert. 88 This issue is one to which many scholarly articles
have been devoted, 89 and is well beyond the scope of this article.
Micro Star, on the other hand, presents a difficult case. The new
"levels" were modified versions of the original audiovisual work (or,
more precisely, were different combinations of the visual elements
that constituted the original audiovisual work).' 90 Again, there was no
public performance or display of those new levels. The question is
whether the CD-ROM containing the new MAP files was itself a
"copy" of the modified audiovisual works, i.e., a material object in
which the modified works were fixed, as is required for a violation of
the reproduction and distribution rights. The CD-ROM containing the
new MAP files is certainly a material object which can be copied and
distributed to the public; and the MAP files are permanently "fixed"
in the CD-ROM.' 9' The difficulty arises from the fact that the MAP
files are not self-contained; they cannot generate a display
without
92
interacting with the game engine and the source art library.

187. See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.
1991)(unpublished decision), available at 1991 WL 5171, at **3 ("[W]e are persuaded that
Nintendo raises a substantial question on the merits ....Galoob's argument that 17 U.S.C. §
117 provides a defense to that claim is not so strong as to dispel that substantial question."); see
also Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1994)
(describing the issues raised at the preliminary injunction hearing).
188. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354,
1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 108288 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
189. In the context of Section 117, see Stephen Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer
Software Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 197 (1992);
Robert A. Kreiss, Comment, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1497. More
generally, see Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don't Judge a Sale by its License:
Transfers Under the First-Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2001); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line
Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
190. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing
operation of MAP files).
191. Id.at 1112 ("[T]he audiovisual displays assume a concrete or permanent form in the
MAP files.").
192. Id. at 1110 ("When the player selects one of the [new] levels, the game engine
references the [allegedly infringing] MAP files, but still uses the [original] art library to generate
the images that make up that level.").
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In essence, there are three works of authorship in this situation:
the original game (which is fixed in a CD-ROM); the new MAP files
(a computer program, which is a type of literary work, fixed in a
different CD-ROM); and the modified game which results from the
interaction of the two other works. Is the modified game "fixed in
tangible medium of expression"? It is "sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated" to others, and it exists "for a period of more than
transitory duration."1' 93 The user perceives the same modifications
each and every time he or she uses the new MAP file with the original
game.194 If Micro Star was reproducing and distributing both CDROMs, we would unquestionably find that it was distributing
"copies" of the modified game; the fact that the copies consisted of
two CDs instead of one would be no more significant than publishing
a book in two volumes. But because Micro Star was reproducing and
distributing only the CD-ROM containing the new MAP files, we
must determine whether that single CD-ROM by itself constitutes a
"copy" of the modified game. We might consider the answer to this
question to be a matter of degree: the new MAP files described the
audiovisual display "down to the last detail."' 95 Judge Kozinski
analogized the new MAP files to a paint-by-numbers kit; each MAP
file described a game level in such detail that its final appearance was
96
essentially fixed, even though the actual paint was not included.

The new MAP files in Micro Star can be analogized to taking an existing novel and
using the words in it to form a new novel. While the second novel was unquestionably
"derived" from the first, it probably would not be considered infringing, because the individual
words in a novel cannot be protected by copyright; only the original selection and arrangement
of those words are protected, and the second novel has departed markedly from the original
selection and arrangement. With an audiovisual work, however, it is more likely that the
individual component images are protected by copyright, see Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323
F.3d 279, 284 (4th Cir. 2003) (individual "clip art" images are protected by registration of
compilation of such images); so any recombination of those images might still be considered
infringing, at least as long as the resulting combination was "substantially similar" to the
original combination.
193.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "fixed").

194.
Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111 ("[T]he audiovisual display that appears on the
computer monitor when a [new] level is played is described-in exact detail-by [an allegedly
infringing] MAP file.").
195.

Id.

196. Id. at 1110. The practical effect is the same as recording an edited movie onto a
videotape and distributing it to the public: the public cannot view the videotape without "the aid
of a machine or device" (a television and a VCR), but the altered work is considered "fixed" on
the videotape, even though the television supplies the red, green and blue pixels of which the
picture is composed. In this case, the "machine or device" is not only the computer on which
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Alternatively, we might consider that the statutory definition of
fixation was "intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable
distinctions.., under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases
has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work
is fixed."' 197 In other words, Congress wanted to make copyright
technology-neutral.
Finally, consider the statement that "a
copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in
any substantial part."' 198 Under this standard, reproducing only part of
a derivative work is infringing, even if it is only the portion that is
original to the derivative work author.
All three of these
considerations point to the same conclusion: the CD-ROM containing
the new MAP file is a (partial) fixation of the modified audiovisual
work, and is primafacie infringing.
From an economic point of view, one can argue that the outcome
in both Galoob and Micro Star should be the same. In both cases, the
end result is a private performance of a modified version of the
original work; and in both cases, the add-on (the Game Genie in
Galoob, the MAP files in Micro Star) must be used with the original
work in order to function. 199 By providing the ability to modify the
original work, the add-on enhances the attractiveness of the original
work and thereby makes it more valuable to consumers. 200 But the
add-on simultaneously makes authorized derivative works less
attractive by competing with them. 20 1 If I can play a modified version
of Donkey Kong on my Game Genie, or a modified version of Duke

the game is played (which supplies the colored pixels), but a computer loaded with an art library
of pre-existing combinations of pixels.
197. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665.
198. Id. at 61, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675.
199. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1082 (1997) (advocating fair use protection for "independent works that
merely interoperate with a copyrighted work"). Nimmer appears to take this position, albeit
indirectly, by analyzing a counterfactual situation instead of the actual facts. See 2 NIMMER,
supra note 48, § 8.09[A], at 8-142 n.12.21 ("To the extent that [Micro Star]... incorporated
into its own product coding sufficient to run Nuke-it even without the purchase of Duke Nukem,
the result of this case contrary to that reached in Galoob is amply warranted.").
200. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1295-96
(N.D. Cal. 1991) ("The only empirical evidence of market reaction to the Game Genie...
indicates that the Game Genie will enhance, not detract from, Nintendo's sales."), affd, 964
F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
201. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113 ("[B]y selling [Nuke-it], Micro Star impinged on
FormGen's ability to market new versions of the [Duke Nukem] story.") (internal quotes
omitted).
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Nukem with my new MAP files, I am probably less likely to buy
Donkey Kong II or Duke Nukem 11.202
In Galoob, however, one cannot say that the Game Genie was a
"copy" of the modified audiovisual work, because none of the
copyrightable expression of the modified work is fixed in the Game
Genie. 1°3 The Game Genie was simply a tool that enabled the user to
make modifications when playing the game; and all such

modifications were merely private performances of an unfixed
derivative work.20 4 In Micro Star, an equivalent device would be an

unauthorized "build editor" which permitted a user to make new game
levels.20 5 So long as the user used the build editor only to temporarily
modify his or her own game, no infringement would occur, as in
Galoob. But as soon as the user fixed a new level by saving its MAP
file, the fixed MAP file would constitute a "copy" (and hence a
"reproduction") of the modified audiovisual work,20 6 and any sale of
the new MAP files would constitute a public distribution of the
modified audiovisual work.207

202.
On the other hand, in Galoob the District Court made a factual finding that few
people would want to buy an authorized derivative that had such minor modifications, see 780
F. Supp. at 1295 ("There is neither evidence nor reason to believe that a consumer who owns the
original game would invest a similar amount in a slight variation thereof."). In Micro Star, the
copyright owner expressly allowed new MAP files to be distributed for free, see 154 F.3d at
1109, which would probably diminish the desire of some consumers to buy an authorized
derivative work, although it would not diminish their ability to do so in terms of disposable
income, as would competing commercial sales.
780 F. Supp. at 1291 ("[A] consumer utilizing the Game Genie for noncommercial,
203.
private enjoyment ... neither generates a fixed transferable copy of the work, nor exhibits or
performs the work [publicly] for commercial gain.").
204.
Id. ("The Game Genie is a tool by which the consumer may temporarily modify the
way in which to play a video game, legally obtained at market price. Any modification is for
the consumer's own enjoyment in the privacy of the home.").
See 154 F.3d at 1109 (describing authorized "Build Editor" utility).
205.
206.

See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.

207.
Public distribution of an unauthorized "build editor" might be challenged on the
ground that it contributes to the infringement of the reproduction and derivative work rights by
individuals; but because the "build editor" principally enables private performances, which are
likely to be fair uses, it is likely that a "build editor" would pass muster under the Supreme
Court's "capable of substantial non-infringing uses" standard. See Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). If, however, the video game console is
subject to a "technological protection measure that effectively controls access to a [copyrighted]
work" (such as the computer program that controls the console), then an unauthorized "build
editor" might violate the anti-trafficking provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2) (2000); see also Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. GameMasters,
Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining distribution of a Game
Enhancer for Sony PlayStation games).
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D. Home Viewing of a Motion Picture
Suppose that a person watching a videotape or DVD at home
fast-forwards through certain parts of a movie, or presses the mute
button during playback.
Such a viewer perceives a different
audiovisual experience than the viewer who views the movie all the
way through without pushing any buttons. Is this the preparation of
an infringing derivative work? If fixation is not required, it is; but
under the proposed interpretation it is not, because there has not been
any reproduction of the movie, nor has there been a public
distribution, public performance or public display.
Again, this
construction makes sense, because it avoids making an infringer out
of everyone who uses their remote control while viewing a motion
picture at home.20 8
Suppose instead that the same person uses the remote control to
give a live performance of the work in the same manner, but does so
in a public exhibition. Under the Ninth Circuit's requirement that the
modified work incorporate the original work in some "concrete or
permanent form, ' 20 9 this could not be an infringement, because there
is no permanence; the live performance of the modified work is
evanescent and disappears as soon as it is finished. Yet there is no
question that such a public performance should be an infringement of
the copyright,21 0 just as it would be if the person publicly performed a
musical stage play based on a copyrighted motion picture. 211
Now consider the facts in Huntsman v. Soderbergh, an action
currently pending in federal court in Colorado.21 2 Huntsman is a local
distributor of movies edited by Clean Flicks, a Utah company that
reproduces and distributes edited versions of copyrighted Hollywood

208. See Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291 (Neither fast-forward nor slow-motion
"permanently modifies or alters the original work, [nor] produces a separate work which can
then be transferred in any way.").
209.
Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110.
210.
Cf Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291 (distinguishing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), on the ground that in Midway, defendant "was making money

from the public performance of the altered game").
211.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 355-56 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (musical play "Scarlett Fever" was a primafacie violation
of the right to prepare derivative works based on "Gone With The Wind"). This, of course, does

not answer the further question whether there is a fair use defense for such a performance.
Compare id. at 357-61 ("Scarlett Fever" was neither a parody nor a satire, and was not a fair
use) with SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268-76 (11 th Cir. 2001)

(novel "The Wind Done Gone" was a parody and critique of "Gone With the Wind" and was a
fair use).
212.

Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 29, 2002).
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movies to the public. 2 13 The gimmick is that there is a one-to-one
exchange: Clean Flicks alleges that it only rents or sells as many
copies of the altered movie as the number of copies it has lawfully
purchased . 4
Huntsman originally filed suit against 16 prominent film
directors for a declaratory judgment that his business did not infringe
any copyrights or trademarks. 2 15 The Directors Guild of America was
permitted to intervene as a defendant, and it filed a counterclaim
against Huntsman, Clean Flicks, and several other companies
engaging in similar operations,2 16 alleging a violation of the Lanham
Act for distributing edited versions of movies with their directors'
names on them, allegedly a false attribution of origin.2t 7 The
directors, of course, do not own the copyrights in their films; the

213. See http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
214. See Second Amended Complaint at 4, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, Civil Action No. 02M-1662 (D. Colo. filed Oct. 28, 2002), availableat
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/copyright/cflixstud102802cmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2004). Clean Flicks alleges that it either: (1) distributes an authorized copy together with the
edited copy; (2) preserves the authorized copy but renders it inoperable and replaces it with an
edited copy; or (3) makes a single edited copy available to a consortium of members who have
purchased an authorized copy. Id.
215. The sixteen directors are: Stephen Soderbergh, Robert Altman, Michael Apted,
Taylor Hackford, Curtis Hanson, Norman Jewison, John Landis, Michael Mann, Philip Noyce,
Brad Silberling, Betty Thomas, Irwin Winkler, Martin Scorsese, Stephen Spielberg, Robert
Redford, and Sydney Pollack. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 214, at 1-2.
216. In addition to the original plaintiffs (Huntsman and Clean Flicks of Colorado,
L.L.C.), the counterclaim defendants include Clean Flicks; MyCleanFlicks; Trilogy Studios,
Inc., Family Shield Technologies, Inc.; ClearPlay, Inc.; Clean Cut Cinemas; Family Safe Media;
EditMyMovies; Family Flix USA, L.L.C.; and Play It Clean Video, Inc. Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 214, at 1. As will be explained below, Trilogy, Family Shield and Clear
Play operate in a manner that is different from Clean Flicks and the other defendants. See infra
notes 224, 233-35 and accompanying text.
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). The Lanham Act claim is based on Gilliam v.
Am. Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), in which the Second Circuit held that the
writers and directors of the British comedy series "Monty Python's Flying Circus" had a
Lanham Act claim against ABC for broadcasting heavily-edited versions of the shows on
American television. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-25. The continued viability of this cause of
action is questionable, however, in light of the subsequent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), which held that a
failure to attribute authorship of a copyrighted work was not a "false designation of origin"
under the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court did preserve the possibility of a cause of action for
false advertising for materially misleading the public, but such a claim would be limited to
requiring correct information in "commercial advertising or promotion," rather than a
prohibition on selling the edited version. See 15 U.S.C. § I125(a)(1)(B); Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004).
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studios do.218 Huntsman therefore filed an amended complaint adding

claims for declaratory relief against the major motion picture
studios, 219 and the studios filed counterclaims alleging copyright
infringement against Clean Flicks and the other counterdefendants.22 °
Clean Flicks' business model clearly violates the copyright laws.
Clean Flicks is reproducing and distributing derivative works:
modified versions of copyrighted motion pictures. The fact that
Clean Flicks alleges a one-to-one exchange does not exonerate it; the
copyright owner has the exclusive right to make new fixations of the
copyrighted work22' (or any modified versions of the work),2 22 and
Clean Flicks is making new fixations without authorization. One
cannot publish thousands of copies of a bowdlerized version of a
novel just because one has purchased the same number of copies of
the original from an authorized distributor. If that were the case, the
copyright owner could never enforce his or her copyright at the
reproduction stage; he or she would have to wait until the allegedly
infringing copies were actually distributed in order to ensure that no
one-to-one exchange had occurred. 3
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title."); Id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire" to include "a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use.., as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,.., if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire"); F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 317-18 (2001).
219. The eight studios named in the Second Amended Complaint are: Metro Goldwyn
Mayer Studios, Inc.; Time Warner Entertainment Co. (Warner Bros.); Sony Pictures
Entertainment; Walt Disney Enters., Inc.; Dreamwerks L.L.C.; Universal City Studios, Inc.;
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp; and Paramount Pictures Corp. Second Amended Complaint,
supranote 214, at 2.
220. Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, Huntsman v.
Soderbergh, Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. filed Dec. 13, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/copyright/cflixstudl213O2acc.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2004).
221. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords"); Id. § 101 (defining "copies" and "phonorecords" as material objects in which
the work is fixed).
222. See id § 106(2) (exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work"). Under the proposed alternative interpretation, the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works is violated in conjunction with the exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
223. By contrast, as a result of the first-sale doctrine, it may not be an infringement to
physically alter a purchased copy of a copyrighted work and to sell the altered copy. See supra
notes 165-73 and accompanying text. The principal reason for this distinction is that, unlike the
purported one-to-one exchange, the first-sale doctrine ensures that the copyright owner has in
fact sold (or given away) an authorized copy of the work. In addition, the first-sale doctrine is
inherently self-limiting: an artist who has to modify individual copies of a copyrighted work is
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But not all of the defendants are infringing in the blatant manner
of Clean Flicks. For example, a company called Clear Play does not
reproduce the copyrighted work in any form. Instead, it sells software
that, when used in conjunction with an authorized copy of the motion
picture, automatically instructs the DVD player to skip over certain
parts of the movie or to mute the volume at certain moments during
playback.224 What the viewer sees is an edited version of the motion
picture. If fixation is not required in any manner, the use of this
software would be a violation of the right to prepare derivative works;
but such a construction would also make an infringer out of the
person who simply uses the fast-forward button and the mute button
to accomplish the same thing.
If we use the proposed alternative interpretation, there has been
no public performance or public display of the modified audiovisual
work, so a viewer who uses the Clear Play software is not liable for
copyright infringement. Whether Clear Play itself is directly liable
depends on whether the CD-ROM containing the software mask is a
"copy" of the modified audiovisual work, as is required for both the
reproduction right and the public distribution right. Because the Clear
Play CD-ROM contains only instructions for modifying a copyrighted
work (in the form of time codes and software instructions) but does
not itself contain any sounds or images, it can be argued that it is not a
"copy" in which the altered audiovisual work is fixed.225 This
superficially attractive position, however, misunderstands the
distinction between the intangible work and a tangible copy of the
work.

unlikely to sell enough copies to substantially interfere with the copyright owner's ability to
market competing derivative works.
Drawing a distinction between the first-sale doctrine and a one-to-one exchange
avoids injecting into every copyright case a question of fact concerning the alleged infringer's
subjective intention. An alleged infringer caught with multiple copies of an edited work could
always claim that he or she intended only to exchange them for authorized copies.
224. ClearPlay's technology currently works only with DVDs played on personal
computers, but there are plans to develop a version to be incorporated into stand-alone DVD
players. See The Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion
for Summary Judgment, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, Civil Action No. 02-M-1 662 (D. Colo. filed
June 6, 2003) at 10-11, available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/Huntsman-vSoderbergh/
20030617 _support sumj.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). By contrast, Counter-Defendant
Family Shield provides a combination software and hardware device that connects to and
automatically controls a standard VCR or DVD player. Id. at 6-7.
225. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675 ("[T]o
constitute a violation of section 106(2), the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form.").
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As in Micro Star, there are three works involved here: the
original movie (which is fixed on a DVD); the time codes and
software instructions for that movie (which are fixed on the CDROM); and the edited version of the movie which is perceived by the
viewer when he or she plays the original movie with the software
mask.226 As in Micro Star, the edited movie (an intangible derivative
work) is fixed in a combination of two tangible objects: the DVD
distributed by the studio, and the CD-ROM distributed by Clear
Play.227 As in Micro Star, therefore, the proper conclusion is that the
CD-ROM distributed by Clear Play is a partial fixation of the
intangible derivative work, and that reproducing or distributing such a
CD-ROM is a primafacie violation of the right to prepare derivative
works.228

Is there a meaningful distinction between Micro Star and Clear
Play? The only difference is that in Micro Star, the software
instructions resulted in a new arrangementof the component images
comprising the underlying work, whereas in Clear Play the software
instructions result only in a new selection of images and sounds. One
might consider a detailed description of an audiovisual work to be a
"fixation" of that work, even if the source art library was not
included; whereas a description of portions of a work to be skipped
might merely be considered to be a different way to experience an
existing audiovisual work. The statute, however, makes it clear that
mere edits to an original work can be a sufficient modification to
qualify as a derivative work. It states that "[a] work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
'derivative work."' 2 29 While this sentence alone might be construed
to require substitutions or additions, instead of cuts, the Act also
specifically states that an "abridgement [or] condensation" may be a
derivative work.23 °

With respect to fixation, the situation in Clear Play is much
closer to Micro Star than to Galoob. In Galoob, the altered
audiovisual performance was not fixed; it existed only as long as the
226.

See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.

227.

See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.

228. To clarify, I believe this result is the one that is most consistent with the statute as
currently written; I do not necessarily believe that it is wise copyright policy.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of"derivative work").
230.
Id; cf Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y U.S. 209, 217 n.29 (1983) ("Although the infringer has added no expression

of his own, he has contributed the arguably expressive effort of editing.").
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altered game was being played.23 ' In Micro Star, the MAP file
2 32
describing the altered audiovisual work was fixed in a CD-ROM.
In the case of Clear Play, the edited audiovisual work is fixed in part
in the original DVD and in part in the CD-ROM. If one plays the
same movie with the same software mask, one will always see and

hear the same altered performance.
This state of affairs is temporary, however, as Clear Play seeks
to develop software that would allow users to customize the software
Indeed, two of Clear Play's
mask to their individual taste.
competitors have already achieved differing degrees of customization.
Counter-Defendant Family Shield provides "Movie Shield" hardware
and software which groups edits into eight categories and allows the
user to choose which categories are to be masked during any
particular viewing; 233 while Counter-Defendant Trilogy Systems, Inc.,
provides "Movie Mask" software which allows users to designate
specific frames, scenes or sounds which they wish to skip or mute
during playback.23 4 A fully customizable system like Movie Mask
would appear to be indistinguishable from the Game Genie in Galoob
and should be held not to violate the right to prepare derivative
works.2 35
It can be argued that the software masks distributed by Clear
Play do nothing more than to automate a process that could be
accomplished by an individual user using the fast-forward and mute
buttons on his or her remote.23 6 This argument fails because
automating specific edits results in a fixation of those edits. Under
the proposed interpretation, it is not the private performance of the

231.
232.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.

233.
See Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 224, at 7. The eight
categories are Disturbing Visuals, Immodesty, Minor Language, Major Language, Nudity,
Religious References, Sexual Situations, and Violence.
234.
Id. at 12. Trilogy also offers a variety of pre-programmed editing options with its
Movie Mask Software. Id.
This result is consistent with the copyright misuse doctrine, which seeks to prevent
235.
copyright holders from using their copyrights to gain commercial control over technology that is
not itself subject to copyright protection. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,
166 F.3d 772, 792-95 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the owner of copyright in software for
telephone switching systems improperly attempted to gain commercial control over hardware
market by requiring that software only be used with microprocessor cards manufactured by
copyright owner).
236. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (using a Game Genie "is analogous in purpose, if not in technology, to
skipping portions of a book, leaming to speed read, [or] fast-forwarding a video"), aff'd, 964
F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
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edited movie that infringes the right to prepare derivative works, but
only the reproduction and distribution of the software mask, which
contains a fixed set of edits.
A series of examples will help illustrate the difference. If one
published a book that described the contents of a DVD at certain time
codes or frame numbers, that would most likely be considered purely
factual information that would enable viewers to exercise their
individual discretion during playback. If one published a book that
recommended or encouraged using the fast-forward and mute buttons
at certain times or during certain frames, the instructions for
modifying the work could be described as "fixed," but it is unlikely
that a court would consider the modified audiovisual work itself to be
fixed in book form, since no new fixation of sounds or images has
occurred.237 Clear Play merely goes one step beyond such a book by
automating the fast-forward-and-mute process. But as soon as that
line is crossed, we have moved from a situation in which the
individual user is exercising his or her discretion as to how to
temporarily modify a work in the privacy of his or her own home (a
private performance of an unfixed derivative work) to a situation in
which the only discretion the individual user has is whether to use a
particular software mask (a fixed set of edits) or not. It is precisely at
this point that we can expect a substantial number of users would pay
for the convenience of having someone else make edits for them, and
therefore it is at this point that a238separate market for an edited version
of the work can be said to exist.
It is also relatively easy to draw a bright line between tools that
enable users to prepare their own derivative works, such as the Game
Genie, the Build Editor and the Movie Mask software, and the output
of those tools, such as the MAP files in Micro Star and the individual
software masks published by Clear Play. If a tool results only in an
unfixed private performance of a derivative work (like the Game
Genie), there is no infringement by the user, and therefore there can
be no liability for contributory infringement. 239 Even if the tool

237. See Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291 ("Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the
copyright laws, for a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how to modify the
rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game.").
238. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 162, § 5.3.1 at 5:84-1 ("[T]he reproduction right leaves
off and derivative rights begin at that point at which the contribution of independent expression
to an existing work effectively creates a new work for a different market.").
239. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970 ("Contributory infringement is a form of third-party
liability .... [A] party cannot [be held liable for] authoriz[ing] another party to infringe a
copyright unless the authorized conduct would itself be unlawful.").
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permits the user to fix a derivative work, most tools are "capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, 240 because they can be used to
modify public domain works, the user's own works, or the

copyrighted works of others who do not object to private use.241 (In
addition, the private use of such tools might qualify as a fair use.242)
Only fixed works that are individually tailored to modify specific
copyrighted works, such as the MAP files or the software masks, will
constitute a primafacie infringement of the right to prepare derivative
243

works.

This conclusion does not necessarily mean that Clear Play and
the other counter-defendants should ultimately be held liable. Under
the fair use doctrine, the court may consider the effect of the use on
the potential market for both the original work and derivative versions
of the original. 244 The net effect on the market of the new game levels
in Micro Star, on the one hand, and the fixed edits in Clear Play, on
the other, are very different. In Micro Star we can expect that most
purchasers who bought the original game would be willing to
purchase new game levels as well, so that the distribution of new
MAP files is likely to have a negative effect on the market for
authorized derivative works.245 In the case of Clear Play, there is a
market for the "clean" version of a motion picture,246 but there is little
overlap between that market and the market for the original, because
it is unlikely that most viewers will purchase two copies of the
240. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
241. Id. at 443 ("Even if itwere deemed that home-use recording of copyrighted material
constituted infringement, the Betamax [videotape recorder] could still legally be used to record
noncopyrighted material or material whose owners consented to the copying.").
242. Id. at 447-55 (holding that home use of a videotape recorder for private,
noncommercial time-shifting is a fair use); see also Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening
Brief, supra note 224, at 25 ("[The Studios] have conceded that, at a minimum, the consumers'
use of the Player Control Parties' technologies to view DVDs in their own homes is a probable
fair use of the Studios' works.").
243. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
that new MAP files would not be infringing if they could be used with other video games).
244. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590 (1994).
245. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113 ("[B]y selling [Nuke-lt], Micro Star impinged on
FormGen's ability to market new versions of the [Duke Nukem] story.") (internal quotes
omitted). In Galoob, by contrast, the court expressly made a finding that the changes were so
minor that the Game Genie was unlikely to interfere with the market for new versions of
Nintendo games. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1295
(N.D. Cal. 1991), afrid,964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
246. The very existence of a large number of companies providing edited versions of
motion pictures and software masks demonstrates that there is a potential market for such
products.
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movie. 247 Most viewers will purchase either the original version or
the "clean" version only, so as long as the software mask technology
requires the consumer who desires the latter to purchase the former,
there is little net loss to the copyright owner. 248 True, some parents
might want to buy both versions,249 so they could watch the original
version and they could let their kids watch the "clean" version; but it
is unlikely that they would be willing to pay double the full price to
get both versions. A copyright owner might be able to sell a
"bundled" package that includes both versions, but one would expect
that the price of a bundled version would be only a little more than the
price of a single version.25 0 Consequently, the economic harm to the
copyright owner of permitting others to make and sell software masks
may be relatively small; 251 whereas the public benefit of allowing
competition in software masks is that the public will get to choose
between many different edited versions of the same motion picture.
Some will object to the contention that making and selling
software masks is a fair use on the ground that the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works helps protect the "moral right" of the
director (or other contributors) 252 to have the work viewed in the form
247. Cf Goldstein, supra note 230, at 217 n.24 ("[A]lthough the market for abridgments
and condensations substantially overlaps the market for complete novels [or movies], the
overlap is by no means perfect.").
248. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of
New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 86-87 (2000). Loren advocates a test
that expressly considers "whether the copyright owner in the underlying work is being
compensated for the use of material ... that is being referenced by the integrated work." Id. at
86. While this approach makes good policy sense, the Copyright Act as presently written
appears to take such market considerations into account only in the context of the fair use
doctrine.
249. A counterexample is the ability of the studios to sell both the theatrical-release
version of a motion picture and "special edition," a different version of the same movie with
additional footage. However, it seems likely that the demand for new footage is more like the
demand for a sequel, whereas the demand for edited versions is more in the nature of a
substitute. Ultimately, this is an empirical question which can be addressed by consumer
surveys at a trial on the issue of fair use. See Campbell, 569 U.S. at 593-94 (remanding for
evidence of the effect of an alleged parody on the potential market for non-parody derivatives).
250. This is analogous to one of the "additional features" included on the DVD version of
a motion picture, which generally are included for only a little more than the ordinary purchase
price of a DVD.
Indeed, if the studios are unwilling to produce or license edited versions or software
251.
masks at all, then the economic harm to the copyright owner of permitting others to make and
sell software masks may be zero. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("The market for potential
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or
license others to develop.").
Exactly who should be considered the "author" of a motion picture, a highly
252.
collaborative art form, is a matter of some difficulty. See Craig A. Wagner, Motion Picture
Colorization,Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628, 714-15 (1989).
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There are several responses to this

concern. First, Congress has considered and has expressly rejected
any recognition of moral rights in motion pictures.254 If we as a
society wish to recognize moral rights, we should do so expressly, in
a statute enacted by Congress, rather than indirectly through
overbroad statutory interpretation.255
Second, it is the major motion picture studios themselves that
benefit most greatly from the absence of moral rights for motion
pictures. Under standard industry arrangements, the director or other
participants do not have final say over how a motion picture will be
edited after its initial release.
The studios own the copyrights; and
studios traditionally have few qualms about cutting a motion picture
For an extensive analysis, see Dougherty, supra note 218, at 267-316 (analyzing claims of
producers, directors, screenwriters, cinematographers, editors, performers, production designers
and composers); see also Stuart K. Kauffman, Motion Pictures, Moral Rights, and the Incentive
Theory of Copyright: The Independent Film Produceras "Author," 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 749 (1999) (contending that the producer of an independent film should be considered an
"author").
253. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed at
note 217, supra. In other countries, the moral right of integrity is separate from the economic
right to prepare derivative works. See, e.g., Turner Entertainment Co. v. Huston, CA Versailles,
No. 68, Roll No. 615/92, Dec. 19, 1994 (awarding damages to John Huston's heirs for the
broadcast in France of a colorized version of the motion picture THE ASPHALT JUNGLE (MGM
1950)). An English translation is available at 16 ENT. L. REP. No. 10, Mar. 1995, at 3.
254. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (providing limited rights of attribution and integrity in
"works of visual art"); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (excluding any "motion picture or other audiovisual
work" and "any work made for hire" from the definition of a "work of visual art"). For an
account of previous failed attempts to enact federal moral rights legislation for motion pictures,
see Wagner, supra note 252, at 706-11.
255. For a proposal, see Wagner, supra note 252, at 712-24; see generally Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985). Recent efforts have focused on the more limited goal of enacting a
federal right of attribution. See Ginsburg, supra note 217; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section
43(a), 77 Wash. L. Rev. 985 (2002).
256. See Kauffman, supra note 252, at 751-52. The current collective bargaining
agreement between the studios and the directors permits the Employer (the production
company) to designate "[t]he individual having final cutting authority over the motion picture."
Directors' Guild of America, Inc., Basic Agreement of 2002, Article 7-206 [hereinafter DGA
Basic Agreement], available at http://www.dga.org/contracts/BA-pdfs/BA-2002-article-7.pdf
(last visited Apr. 26, 2004). However, the Agreement does require that the Employer offer the
director "the first opportunity to make such cuts as are required" for network television
showings. DGA Basic Agreement, Article 7-509(b). In practice, only a few directors have the
economic clout to get their films shown on television without cuts. Steven Spielberg, for
example, was able to insist that both SCHINDLER'S LIST (1993) and SAVING PRIVATE RYAN
(1998) be shown on TV without cuts. See Marvin J. Levy, Letter to the Editor: No Scenes Were
Cut From "Schindler'sList," WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1997, at A19 (availableat 1997 WL-WSJ
2430208); Richard Huff, No Cutsfor "Ryan" on ABC, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 2001, at 141
(availableat 2001 WL 27987060).

2004]

COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIVE WORKS & FIXATION

1043

for content-based reasons (to obtain a more favorable MPAA rating,
or to edit out material for airline showings or for broadcast television)
or for economic ones (to fit the movie onto a TV screen or within a
two-hour TV time slot).2 57 It fits the definition of "chutzpah" for the
same studios to argue that they (as copyright owners)
should be
258
entrusted with protecting the moral rights of the director.
Third, any concern we might have about the reputation of the
director being tarnished by a poorly-edited movie can be handled with
an appropriate labeling requirement.25 9 So long as the person using
Clear Play or similar technology is aware that the software mask
(whether customizable or not) has not been produced by the director
or the studio, it seems unlikely that either would suffer any
reputational harm.
Fourth, we must remember that copyright is supposed to be for
the benefit of the public, and that the benefit to the artist is supposed
to be of secondary concern. 2 6 If a segment of the public wishes to
see movies with less sex, violence and foul language, it ought to be
able to do so without having to submit to the "all or nothing" bargain
offered by the studios.26' Since the editing is being done by private

257.
See Kauffman, supra note 252, at 751; see generally Janine V. McNally,
CongressionalLimits on TechnologicalAlterations to Film. The Public Interest and the Artists'
Moral Right, 5 HiGH TECH. L.J. 129, 132-35 (1990). The DGA Basic Agreement attempts to
limit these practices, providing that "Employer will endeavor to license films for network
telecasting with no abridgment other than for [Network] Broadcast Standards and Practices
reasons," DGA Basic Agreement, Article 7-509(b), and limiting the cuts that can be made for
airline showings. DGA Basic Agreement, Article 7-509(0. However, changing the format of
movies ("pan and scan") and editing for content is still commonplace.
258.
See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 255, at 37 ("On the whole,
copyright law cannot function as an adequate moral right substitute. The copyright law's
overriding concern for the copyright owner rather than the creator is a significant disadvantage
for creators whose moral right interests conflict with the pecuniary interests of the copyright
owners of their works."); Lemley, supra note 199, at 1033-34.
259.
This was the approach originally taken in the United States with respect to the
colorization of black-and-white motion pictures. In 1988, Congress required that anyone
distributing a "materially altered version" of a film on the National Film Registry had to meet
certain labeling requirements. See National Film Preservation Act of 1998, § 4, P.L. 100-446,
102 Stat. 1782 (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 178c; repealed 1992). Similarly, the DGA Basic
Agreement provides that "Employer may not identify any version of a theatrical motion
picture ... as the 'Director's Cut' unless it has been so identified by the Director." DGA Basic
Agreement, Article 7-518. By contrast, the use of the familiar pan-and-scan format disclaimer
("This film has been modified from its original version. It has been formatted to fit your
screen.") appears to be voluntary.
260.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
261.
See Loren, supranote 248, at 89 ("In the United States, copyright law is not intended
to permit a copyright owner to control the manner in which her work is viewed.").
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parties and not by the government, it cannot be said to constitute
"censorship" of free expression. To the contrary, permitting Clear
Play and similar technologies would allow multiple users to freely
express what types of things they do or do not wish to see and hear.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Galoob is inherently selfcontradictory, as it states on the one hand that a derivative work does
not need to be "fixed," but it holds on the other hand that a derivative
work does need to be embodied in some "concrete or permanent
form. '262 This contradiction stems from the fact that although the
statutory language does not appear to require fixation, reading the
statutory language literally would render illegal merely imagining a
modified version of a copyrighted work. This contradiction can be
eliminated by recognizing that what Congress intended was to
prohibit the public performance of an unfixed derivative work, as well
as the reproduction, public distribution, public performance or public
display of a fixed derivative work. Congress' intent can be fully
implemented by holding that the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works is dependent upon, rather than independent of, the other four
exclusive rights. The advantage of this interpretation is that it leaves
all private performances of a derivative work, whether fixed or
unfixed, outside the realm of copyright infringement.

262.

See supranotes 67-72 and accompanying text.

